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ABSTRACT

Since the 2007 financial crisis the use of collateral has again come back into the focus
of academics and practitioners. However, the existing literature on the determinants of
collateral has concentrated mostly on developed markets, especially the U.S. and the
U.K., although collateral is even more important due to the opaque information that
exists in developing markets. This thesis conducted useful tests of whether the theories
that have been established and applied to explain the determinants of collateral in
developed markets are applicable to the world’s largest emerging market, China. Since
China introduced economic reforms in the late 1970s, it has been growing at high speed,
with the banking sector being the primary source of finance for its growing economy
(Bailey et al., 2011). With this pronounced economic expansion and increasing
competition for funds, the investigation of collateral requirements in bank loans has
been an extrusive issue in China.

Firstly, this research examined the effect of ownership structure on collateral
requirements using a sample of China’s listed firms. I found that compared to non-stateowned enterprises (non-SOEs), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were less likely to be
required to pledge collateral. The empirical results also showed that banks were more
willing to offer unsecured loans to companies with more foreign ownership or with
more bank loans guaranteed by third parties, and the aforementioned effect of state
ownership on reducing collateral requirements became weaker in those companies. This
research also found that the aforementioned effect of state ownership on reducing
collateral requirements became more pronounced for firms operating in regions with
more government intervention.

iv

Secondly, this research examined the effect of ownership structure on the lending
relationships in China’s listed firms. The findings indicated that SOEs were more likely
to receive bank loans from state-owned banks than non-SOEs. The empirical results
also showed that firms with more foreign ownership were more likely to receive bank
loans from foreign banks. There was no significant difference between SOEs and nonSOEs in the probability of obtaining loans from joint stock commercial banks, while
firms with more foreign ownership were more likely to obtain loans from this type of
banks. Moreover, both SOEs and firms with more foreign ownership were more likely
to maintain multiple banking relationships. It was also found that firms that operated in
regions with a better institutional environment had more concentrated ownership in
bank loans rather than multiple banking relationships. My findings also implied that
joint stock commercial banks have a comparative advantage in processing private
information and delivering relationship lending rather than collateral based lending,
while concentrated banking relationships were also helpful for gathering information
and reducing collateral requirements. Moreover, the role of concentrated banking
relationships in reducing collateral requirements was greater for firms that borrow from
joint equity commercial banks.

Finally, this research examined the effect of internal and external corporate governance
mechanisms on collateral requirements from a tunnelling perspective. Using a sample of
China’s listed firms, I found that better-governed firms were less likely to be
expropriated by their controlling shareholder and therefore had lower collateral
requirements. In particular, large owners other than the largest one could form coalitions
and challenge the opportunistic dominant shareholder and the collateral requirements
were accordingly lower, and the effect of other large shareholders was more significant
in non-SOEs. In terms of the board of directors and the supervisory board, the collateral
v

requirements were lower for firms with a smaller board of directors, a larger fraction of
independent directors, where the chairman and CEO positions were separate, and where
there was a larger supervisory board. Moreover, the effects of these board
characteristics were more significant for SOEs than non-SOEs. I also found evidence
that a better institutional environment within China helped to reduce collateral
requirements and the role of institutions were more significant for non-SOEs. Finally, I
found that employing professional experts on the supervisory board showed the benefit
of reducing the collateral requirements for both SOEs and non-SOEs, and the role of
professional supervisors was more significant in more developed regions than in less
developed regions.

In summary, this thesis contributes to the literature of collateral based lending, banking
relationship, and corporate governance, and provides evidence that corporatisation and
privatisation exercised significant effects on the level of collateral requirements when
China’s listed firms were used as an example. Specifically, ownership structure can
impact on the collateral requirements and also on the banking relationships. The effect
of corporate governance on collateral requirements varied across the ownership types.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research motivation

Collateral requirements are terms that are widely used in loan contracts. Credit market
research explains collateral as either an attempt to compensate ex ante asymmetric
information (Bester, 1985, Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987) and/or
a method of reducing ex post incentive problems (Thakor and Udell, 1991), which arise
in transactions between borrowers and lenders. Literature also find empirical evidence
that collateral requirements relates to measures of borrower risk and proxies for private
information (e.g., Jimenez et al., 2006, 2009). Just as Menkhoff et al. (2006, 2012)
showed, most studies focus on mature U.S. and European markets, while the evidence
about the determinants of collateral requirements in emerging markets is scarce.
Therefore, the first motivation was the scarcity of research into the determinants of
collateral requirements in an emerging market such as China. Although China has been
one of the fastest growing economies, it also has an under developed legal system and
financial market (Allen et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2009), where the banking sector has
been the primary source of finance for its growing economy (Bailey et al., 2011). In the
light of these facts the Chinese government introduced a series of reforms to the
banking sector to promote the allocation of bank loans. Accordingly, this study presents
evidence about the determinants of collateral requirements in lending decisions in China
and tests whether they are consistent with the theories that have developed from mature
markets.

Second, it is well documented that government ownership could provide an implicit
protection against bankruptcy through state-owned banks (e.g., Faccio et al., 2006; Firth
et al., 2009; Lin, 2011), but the effect of state ownership on collateral requirements in
1

different scenarios have not been answered yet. China’s listed firms provide an
excellent environment in which to examine the effect that ownership structure has on
collateral requirements because one of the important features of China’s listed firms is
that the ownership of the dominant shareholder, which in many cases is the state, far
exceeds that of the second largest shareholder. On that basis this research was able to
assess the implications that this type of controlling shareholder would have when
determining the collateral requirements.

Third, this research performed a complete test for the role of ownership structure in
banking relationships, including both bank ownership type and number of banking
relationships. A number of important policy and research issues concern the banking
relationships with business firms, for which existing literature also suggests that such
relationships may play key roles in resolving information problems and mitigating
imperfections in the financial market (Berger et al., 2008). This thesis adds to the extant
literature by testing the relationship between firms’ ownership structures and different
bank ownership types, and investigating the impact of ownership structure on the
number of banking relationships. Moreover, the empirical literature has not yet settled
some important issues such as the effect that the number of banking relationships has on
collateral requirements and how the interactive effect between bank ownership type and
number of banking relationships affects collateral requirements.

Fourth, recent studies also showed that banks reward borrowers with a higher quality of
corporate governance with less collateral requirements because they are less likely to be
tunnelled by their controlling shareholders (e.g., Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012).
However, Larcker et al. (2007) argued that existing studies do not have a consensus on
the appropriate measurement of good corporate governance indicators or the number of
2

corporate governance dimensions, and very little is known about the relative importance
of various governance mechanisms. To address this issue, this thesis focused on
comprehensive measures and dimensions of corporate governance practices in Chinese
companies and examined their effects on collateral requirements. Moreover, it is still a
question as to whether the effect of internal and external governance mechanisms on
collateral requirements depends on the type of controlling shareholder.

Finally, it is still an unresolved question about whether the determinants of collateral
requirements can be ascribed to the evolution of the country’s market institutions even
though the law and finance literature has indicated that institutional features play a very
important role on collateral requirements across countries (e.g., Qian and Strahan, 2007;
Bae and Goyal, 2009). China has been suffering significant problems with regional
disparity, despite having achieved great progress in its market-oriented institutional
transformation (Fan et al., 2011). This enabled this research to test the relationship
between the institutional environment and the collateral requirements within one
country, and the under-researched joint impact of the institutional features and
borrower’s characteristics such as ownership structure and corporate governance.
Moreover, the law and finance literature has examined the association between the
institutional environment and the number of banking relationships through crosscountry studies. China’s dataset provided an excellent opportunity to test this question,
which has major advantages over cross-country studies in addressing the issues related
to accounting rules, culture, and other country-level variables (Li et al., 2009).

3

1.2

Research findings

This research empirically examined the determinants of collateral requirements by
hypothesizing that collateral requirements are a function of firm-specific and
macroeconomic variables. The research findings are documented in three parts.

Chapter 3 outlines the fact that SOEs have lower collateral requirements than nonSOEs. Moreover, there is a negative relationship between collateral requirements and
foreign ownership, and the effect of state ownership in reducing collateral requirements
is weaker for firms with more foreign ownership. Firms with more guaranteed loans are
relatively less risky and will use less collateral loans, and the benefit of state ownership
in reducing collateral requirements is weaker for firms with more third party guaranteed
loans. Finally, this research showed that disparity in regional government intervention
matters where state ownership plays a role in collateral requirements; specifically, more
intervention by regional government related to a stronger role of state ownership in
reducing collateral requirements. Although the state often retains substantial ownership
in China’s listed firms, this ownership is undertaken by different types of agencies, each
of which has different motivations and incentive structures. Following Firth et al. (2006)
and Chen et al. (2009), this research grouped SOEs into those affiliated to central
government (SOECGs) and those affiliated to local government (SOELGs) and found
that SOECGs had the lowest level of collateral requirements, SOELGs were in the
middle, and non-SOEs had the highest collateral requirements. This thesis also argues
that state ownership is important for bank finance in the Chinese private sector; indeed I
found that having a state minority ownership significantly reduces the collateral
requirements of non-SOEs.

4

In Chapter 4, China’s banks were divided into four types (policy state-owned banks1,
the big four state-owned banks2, joint stock commercial banks and foreign banks) to
examine whether they have different lending relationships with borrowers’ ownership
structures. I found that SOECGs and SOELGs have a higher probability of obtaining
loans from policy state-owned banks and the big four state-owned banks, respectively.
Moreover, there was no significant difference between SOEs and non-SOEs in the
probability of obtaining loans from joint stock commercial banks, while firms with
more foreign ownership were more likely to obtain loans from this type of banks. I also
found firms with more foreign shares have a higher probability of obtaining loans from
foreign banks. In terms of the number of banking relationships, it increases with state
control and foreign ownership, and decreases with institutional development. Finally,
this research found that the policy state-owned banks were less likely to require firms to
pledge collateral than the big four state-owned banks. Moreover, joint stock commercial
banks are less likely to require firms to pledge collateral than foreign banks. Compared
to the multiple banking relationships, concentrated banking relationships reduce
collateral requirements and the benefits of these concentrated relationships are greater
for firms that borrow from joint stock commercial banks.

In Chapter 5 the role of corporate governance in the collateral requirements of bank
loans was investigated from a tunnelling perspective. I found that a negative
relationship existed between the monitoring from non-controlling block shareholders to
controlling shareholder and collateral requirements. Moreover, collateral is less likely to

1

Policy state-owned banks include the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), the China
Development Bank (CDB), and the Export–Import Bank of China (EXIMBC).
2

The big four state-owned banks include the Bank of China (BOC), the People’s Construction Bank of
China (PCBC), the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
(ICBC).
5

be required when the corporate board of directors is smaller, has more independent
directors, or the CEO and chairman are separate. In terms of the supervisory board,
firms with a larger supervisory board and more expertise in laws and accounting have
lower collateral requirements. It was also found that the development of external
governance was negatively associated with collateral requirements. Some governance
attributes are more significant for SOEs (e.g., board size, independence, separation of
CEOs and chairman, and supervisory board size), whereas other governance attributes
such as the internal governance of other large shareholders and the development of
external governance were more significant for non-SOEs. Finally, a detailed
investigation

indicated

that

supervisory

expertise

and

external

governance

complemented each other in reducing the collateral requirements.

1.3

Contributions

This thesis has made the following contributions:

Firstly, microeconomic theories of banking and financial contracting have explained the
widespread use of collateral as a means of reducing credit rationing under asymmetric
information. In developed markets, empirical literature has also been well documented
about the determinants of collateral requirements in loan contracts (Menkhoff, 2006,
2012). This research used data on financial loans extended to listed firms in China, the
largest developing country, to provide a useful test of whether the theories that were
established and applied to explain determinants of collateral requirements in developed
markets are applicable to emerging markets. These findings could also provide a useful
template for future comparative research based on other emerging and developed
markets.

6

Secondly, there is a growing body of economic literature on the association between
state ownership and access to finance in developing and transition countries (e.g.,
Borisova and Megginson, 2011). This thesis presented fresh evidence on the effect of
state ownership and its interaction effect with firms or regional factors on the collateral
requirements in loan contracts. In addition, because partially privatised and fully stateowned companies maintain dominant positions in all emerging market economies and
continue to be the most important and valuable companies in the European economies,
the relationship between the state ownership of business firms and bank lending policies
that this research documented can also help guide governments that are undertaking
wide privatisation waves.

Thirdly, this thesis adds to the extant literature about banking relations (e.g., Berger et
al., 2008) by testing the relationship between firms’ ownership structures and different
bank ownership types, and investigating the impact of ownership structure on the
number of banking relationships. Moreover, there have been limited studies which
examine the association between banking relationships and collateral requirements as
this research did, so this thesis offers a more complete research framework and
empirical evidence.

Ever since SOEs were reformed and restructured in 1978, corporate governance has
been a major issue in China, so by using a more complex and multi-dimensional
construct to measure the quality of corporate governance, this research not only
contributed to the discussion about the effect of corporate governance on contract
requirements (Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012), it also provides an empirical basis
for evaluating the effectiveness and relative importance of corporate governance
mechanisms in China. This research also presents the output for SOEs and non-SOEs,
7

respectively, which provided a more detailed examination of whether the effects of
governance mechanisms on the collateral requirements in Chinese listed firms depends
on the type of controlling shareholder.

1.4

Structure of the thesis

The thesis is presented in six chapters, with the main structure of each being as follows:

Chapter 1 introduces an overview of the research motivation, research findings,
professional significance of the thesis, and organization of the dissertation.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Chinese economic reform and the potential
implication for collateral requirements in China, such as ownership structure, the
banking sector, corporate governance mechanisms, and institutional development across
different provinces.

Chapter 3 examines the association between ownership structure and collateral
requirements. It begins with a general introduction of the topic, the relevant background
is investigated, and then the basic hypotheses on the determinants of collateral
requirements such as state ownership and its association with other firm characteristics
or government intervention based on reviews of the historical research is presented. To
test this primary hypothesis the corresponding data was collected and summarised, and
then an estimation model was proposed and the empirical evidence was presented.
Finally, some robust checks and additional investigation was conducted.

In addition, to establish a complete research framework, the association between
ownership structures and banking relationships was investigated in Chapter 4. In
particular, the main conclusion obtained from Chapter 3 (that SOEs have lower
8

collateral requirements) is mainly a consequence of the good bank-firm relationships.
As no direct empirical evidence has been presented on this issue, Chapter 4 is a timely
investigation and provides additional evidence from the emerging market. Then in
Chapter 5, the role of corporate governance mechanisms in collateral requirements,
based on the type of controlling shareholders, was investigated. Overall, this research
empirically examined the determinants of collateral requirement by hypothesizing that
collateral requirement is a function of firm-specific and macroeconomic factors.

Chapter 6 includes a summary of the thesis, the implications of the research, and its
limitations and recommendations for future research.

9

CHAPTER TWO: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Extant literature has well documented China’s transition from a centrally planned
socialist economy to a rapidly expanding commercially oriented economy; a transition
with significance for the formation of the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms.
This transformation also involves improvements in the commercial banking system and
the development of a contracting environment. These factors have enabled this research
to check whether the collateral requirements differ depending on ownership structures
and banking relationships, or whether it can be ascribed to the evolution of the country’s
market institutions. There has also been a widespread adoption of western corporate
governance practices in China, but the effects of these mechanisms on collateral
requirements are still unanswered questions.

2.1

Ownership structure

China began its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based
economy in 1978. Under its communist system the government collected revenues from
SOEs and provided financing to those firms according to the state budget, so there was
no need for risk management by banks making use of collateral. Since the reformation
of SOEs began the state tried to give autonomy to enterprises, link reward to
performance and subsequently relinquish its shareholding. That was followed in the
early 1980s by the adoption of the “loan for (fiscal) grant” (bo gai dai) scheme which
was aimed at increasing financial incentives and hardening budget constraint faced by
SOEs. A new phase of reform began in 1984 when the separation between management
and ownership was further emphasised. In the Third Plenary session of the Fourteenth
Chinese Communist Party Congress held in 1993, a new goal, the establishment of a
modern enterprise system, was set for SOE reform. A reform of shareholding was then
10

extended throughout the nation, which resulted in many SOEs being restructured into
joint stock companies and being listed on the stock exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen, and with shares sold to the public. However, governments at various levels
often retained enough shares to maintain control, although some of the equity carved out
of SOEs is now majority owned by private investors, and there are a growing number of
private firms that are now listed.
According to the “Guidelines on Shareholding Experiments” and “Regulatory Opinions
on Joint Stock Companies” issued in 1992, shares in China’s listed firms are classified
into six types: state, legal person3, foreign, management, employee, and individual. On
average, about one third of shares are owned by the state, one third are owned by legal
entities, and one third are owned by individuals and private institutions. Foreign,
management, and employee shares represent less than 10% of the outstanding shares so
they do not constitute major voting blocks.

A distinct characteristic of Chinese firms is that they often have one dominant
shareholder whose ownership is much higher than the second largest shareholder. It was
revealed that on average, the largest shareholder owns 36.6% (median is 35.3%) of a
firm while the second largest owns 8.46% (median is 5.63%), which indicates that the
largest shareholder has substantial control over the firm. Chen et al. (2009) points out
that China’s firms should be categorised according to the type of controlling shareholder
instead of the share type that followed the legal classification of the shares because early
studies that treated state shares and legal person shares as two distinct groups do not
adequately acknowledge the different objectives and incentives of the shareholders. In

3

Legal person shares are owned by the state and by private firms.
11

line with recent literature, this thesis investigated both shares of China’s listed
companies based on the ultimate identification of the controlling shareholders and
ownership concentration by other large shareholders and accounted for how they faced
different comparative advantage of access to direct bank credit.

2.2

Evolution of the banking sector

The Chinese banking system has experienced fundamental structural reforms along with
China’s comprehensive economic reforms that began in 1978. The aim was to transform
the sector from being state-owned, monopolistic and policy driven to a multi-ownership,
competitive, and profit-oriented system. This section contains brief reviews of the
reform procedure of the banking industry that have important implications for their
commercialised operations.

The reform process can be divided into three periods:

2.2.1 First stage of financial reform (1978–1993)
To support a centrally planned economy China established the People’s Bank of China
(PBOC) in December of 1948. Prior to 1978, the Chinese financial system followed a
mono-bank model that only consisted of PBOC. The banks in the PBOC system were
part of the hierarchy to ensure that national production plans would be fulfilled. During
1978–1993, the financial system began the first round of financial reform aimed at
restructuring the operations of its banking system. The PBOC was designated as the
central bank while the government established the “Big Four” wholly state-owned and
specialised banks to take over the lending functions of the PBOC. This included the
Bank of China (BOC) which specialised in transactions related to foreign trade and
investment; the People’s Construction Bank of China (PCBC) which specialised in
12

transactions related to fixed investments; the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) which
specialised in all the banking business in rural areas, and the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC) which took over all the commercial transactions of the PBOC.
Sequentially, the Big Four banks were allowed to enter and compete in all sectors in
1985, but bank loans based on government direction and policies rather than
commercial principles still predominated in the Chinese banking sector in the 1980s and
early 1990s (Linton, 2006), so there was little room or need for risk management by the
use of collateral.

2.2.2 Second stage of financial reform (1994–2002)

The structure of the Chinese banking system evolved further over time, such that in
1994 three wholly state-owned policy banks were established, including the
Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), the China Development Bank
(CDB), and the Export–Import Bank of China (EXIMBC). Specifically, ADBC took
over the policy lending role of the ABC, while CDB took over the policy lending role of
the ICBC and PCBC, and EXIMBC took over the policy lending role of BOC. The
government set up the policy banks to assume responsibility for non-commercially
oriented loans, so the Big Four banks would be free to pursue commercial objectives.
Second, in May 1995 the government enacted the “Commercial Banks Law of the
People’s Republic of China” to construct a legal commercial banking system, and
officially commercialised the operations of state-owned banks by directing them
towards commercial business based on the market principles of capital adequacy,
profitability, risk, and liquidity. As a result, securities such as collateral and third party
guarantees become widely used by commercial banks as important risk management
tools.
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Additionally, a breed of dynamic joint stock commercial banks (banks organised as
companies limited by shares) has been rapidly emerging. Contrary to state-owned banks
which had the state as the single shareholder, joint stock commercial banks have a
plurality of shareholders. As argued elsewhere, the plurality of shareholders may
significantly reduce political interference in the business of these banks, thus delivering
better performance (Lin and Zhang, 2009).

2.2.3 Third stage of financial reform (2003–present)

The third stage was from 2003 when the China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC) was established, primarily to monitor the lending behaviour of banks. The
“Commercial Banks Law of the People’s Republic of China” was also revised at the end
of 2003 to oversee banking reforms and regulate banking operations. The Law also
stipulated that banks evaluate each customer’s level of credit risk and collateral ability
in their lending decisions. Until 2004, the Big Four banks were still SOEs with one
owner – the Chinese government – but in 2005 they began to be privatised by recruiting
strategic investors and being listing on the stock exchange. However, the government
was still the largest shareholder and retained control of the Big Four banks while the
stock control of the joint stock commercial banks was fairly diversified (Ferri, 2009).

With the WTO commitments, the Chinese banking sector was also fully opened to
foreign financial institutions in December 2006. Foreign banks are allowed to enter
China to build a commercial presence through four forms of entry: foreign bank branch,
wholly owned foreign banks, joint ventures, and foreign equity investment. Among
these categories, foreign banks branch, wholly owned foreign banks, and joint ventures
are defined as foreign (funded) banks operating in China. Foreign equity investment in
Chinese banks is an important form of foreign entry, but because foreign investors can
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only acquire minority ownership of domestic banks at present, those banks remain
Chinese banks.
As of 2006, China’s commercial banking system consisted of the Big Four banks,
policy banks, joint stock commercial banks, and foreign banks. The structure of China’s
banking industry is summarised in Table 2.1. According to Almanac of China’s Finance
and Banking, it is shown that the Big Four banks continue to dominate, with market
shares well in excess of 50% in both deposits and loans, followed by the joint stock
commercial banks, policy banks, and then foreign banks. Note that the outstanding
amount of bank loans is significantly greater than the equity or corporate bonds. For
example, bank loans accounting for 87% of total funds were raised by China’s nonfinancial sector as of June 2006 (Bailey et al., 2011). Overall, China’s banking sector
has been the primary source of finance for China’s growing economy, so how firms rely
on their banking relationships has become a key issue.

Insert table 2.1 about here

2.3

Two-tier board structure

These listed firms are governed by two-tier boards that are similar to the GermanJapanese corporate governance approach, and consist of a supervisory board and a
board of directors. The “Company Law of the People’s Republic of China” issued in
1993 first put forward the basic framework for a two-tier board structure, and then it
was amended three times in 1999, 2004, and 2005, respectively. The “Code of
Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China” published by the China Security
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) expanded on the Company Law by specifying the
duties and responsibilities of directors in greater detail. Following this guideline, the
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board of directors was made accountable to shareholders, and was instructed to treat all
shareholders equally and be concerned with the interests of the firm’s various
stakeholders. It was recommended that a board consist of 5 to 19 directors. In 2001, the
independent director system was mandated by the CSRC, and listed firms were required
to have at least one third of their board members being independent directors by June 30,
2003. The CSRC also strongly encouraged firms to separate the roles of chairman and
CEO. However, China introduced the modern corporation concept and culture whilst
extending the reforms of the state-owned economy. Although the responsibilities and
duties of directors closely paralleled those in the West, it is doubtful whether they
played a positive governance role in China because the laws and guidelines in China on
who must propose directors are silent, so in practice large owners tend to appoint
directors and their representatives tend to dominate the board (Wu et al., 2009).

According to the Company Law a listed company must also have a supervisory board
that consists of no less than three members, including representatives of the
shareholders and representatives of the company’s staff and workers. According to the
Corporate Law, the supervisory board mainly carries out financial monitoring functions
which include examining the company’s financial status, and supervising the actions of
the directors and managers to prevent any violations of laws and regulations. It also
states that supervisory members should have professional knowledge and work
experience in accounting and law. A key difference between a board of directors and a
supervisory board is that supervisors of the company cannot concurrently serve as its
directors, managers, and financial officers, so investors expected it to exercise an
oversight role over the performance of the directors and senior management in a
relatively impartial manner (Dahya et al., 2003; Firth et al., 2007a, b; Ding et al., 2009,
2010).
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Although the supervisory board in China still does not have the right to appoint and
dismiss executive directors unlike the German-Japanese approach to corporate
governance, the latest Corporate Law amendment (2005) largely addressed several
important constraints that prevented supervisory boards from functioning properly. First,
supervisory boards now do have the power to propose dismissal of directors and top
managements convicted of crimes, and to sue directors and top managements who
commit fraud. Second, supervisors were allowed to attend board meetings, but the latest
amendment gave them the right to ask questions and make suggestions. Furthermore,
supervisory boards now have the right to submit proposals to shareholder meetings.
Finally, when the board of supervisors discovers something unusual in the operation of
the company, it can conduct an investigation into the operating situation, with the
company bearing the expense. Overall, this thesis can add to the literature via a detailed
investigation of the impact of internal governance on collateral requirements, which has
not been previously examined yet.

2.4

Institutional development across different provinces

China’s listed firms also operate in regions with different degrees of market
development. In reality, China has been suffering a significant and growing problem of
regional disparity despite having achieved great progress in its market-oriented
institutional transformation and economic development. According to Allen et al.
(2005), the overall shareholder (and creditor) rights of China falls in between those
countries with a common-law legal origin benefiting from the highest protection and
those countries with a French civil-law legal origin which exhibit the lowest protection.
Yet this enforcement tends to vary considerably across provinces and municipalities.
Besides, China’s transition from a planned to a market economy necessitated the
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establishment of an almost entirely new set of institutions, which touches on a broad
range of economic, political, and social institutions. According to the World Bank’s
(2006) survey of the investment climate in 120 Chinese cities, the average per-capita
GDP in Southeast China is more than 50 per cent higher than the Northeast, and 150 per
cent above the average for Central and Southwest China. The major factors behind these
economic disparities could be the difference in the institutions and economic policies.
Instead of proposing a straightforward connection between the institutional environment
and economic growth, this research considered the unique inter-regional differences to
be one of the important determinants of a firm’s ability to access unsecured bank
finance, and on that basis investigated whether there is an interactive effect of the
institutions and firm characteristics on collateral requirements. Compared to a cross
country study, sub-national data can focus on specific aspects of the institutional and
political system and control for the diversity in accounting rules, culture and other
country-level variables (Li et al., 2009). It is believed that relevant findings will add to
the growing literature relating to law, institutions, finance and economic growth.

2.5

Conclusion

This chapter has extensively investigated the ownership structure of China’s listed firms,
the evolution of its banking sector, the corporate governance mechanisms in China, and
institutional development across China’s provinces. Firms in China have a unique
ownership structure, including a high proportion of SOEs and high ownership
concentration. It is an unanswered question about whether the specific character has a
quite distinct influence on collateral requirements. This chapter also reviewed the
institutional history of the Chinese banking system, which is made of policy banks, the
Big Four banks, joint stock commercial banks and foreign banks. Furthermore, this
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chapter investigated the two-tier board system adopted in China as a means of
promoting better governance. Finally, it was indicated that China provided a good
research laboratory for the effect of institutional development on collateral requirements
because it combined greater heterogeneity in institutional development across provinces
with homogeneity in other country level variables.
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CHAPTER THREE: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND COLLATERAL
REQUIREMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA’S LISTED FIRMS

3.1

Introduction

The use of collateral has been a common feature of loan contracts between
borrowers and lenders. Based on theories of asymmetric information, research
into the credit market has revealed that the requirements for collateral are the
consequence of adverse selection (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985;
Besanko and Thakor, 1987), and/or moral hazard (Thakor and Udell, 1991). These
researchers argued that collateral can limit potential losses for lenders and sort
observationally equivalent borrows because safer borrowers are less likely to
default (and therefore lose control of the collateral) and are more likely to pledge
collateral in exchange for a lower interest rate on the secured loans. Another
strand of literature has well documented that the government often puts pressure
on the banking system to lend primarily to SOEs, and then the expected
government bailouts of troubled SOEs further increases the supply of bank loans
to these enterprises (Cull et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009). Despite this, there is little
evidence to show how state ownership impacts on collateral requirements.

This thesis extends the existing literature and examines the relationship between
ownership structure and collateral requirements using a sample of China’s listed
firms from 2007 to 2009. China’s listed firms provided an excellent environment
in which to examine the effect that ownership structure has on collateral
requirements. One important feature of China’s listed firms is that the ownership
of the dominant shareholder, which in many cases is the state, far exceeds that of
the second largest shareholder. On that basis this research was able to assess the
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implications regarding the type of controlling shareholder would have on the
setting of collateral requirements. Meanwhile, as the stock market opened up to
foreign investors 4 listed firms were allowed to issue foreign shares, and the
empirical evidence suggests that firms with foreign ownership were able to
improve their information environment (Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al., 2003). A
natural question to ask would be how the interaction between foreign ownership
and state ownership affects the collateral requirements? Furthermore, recent
literature emphasizes the importance of third party guarantees as a substitute for
collateral, which also reduces the risk of the lender not recovering their loans
(Menkhoff et al., 2012). Not much is known about whether ownership structure
and guarantees could substitute for each other. China also combines greater
heterogeneity in government intervention across provinces. These differences in
government intervention therefore enable this study to determine whether the link
between collateral requirements and state ownership is affected by the transition
process from a government command economy to a market oriented economy.

The empirical evidence strongly supports the fact that the requirements for
collateral are lower in SOEs than in non-SOEs. There is also a negative
relationship between collateral requirements and foreign ownership, whereas the
negative relationship between state control and collateral requirements is weaker
in firms with more foreign ownership. Firms with more guaranteed loans are
relatively less risky and will use less collateral loans, while the benefit of state
control in reducing the collateral requirements is weaker for firms who borrow

4

Recently, individuals in China have been allowed to buy foreign shares if they have access to
foreign currency. However, firms with foreign shares are still different from their counterparts
without foreign ownership because they issue financial statements that are compliant with
international standards (Firth et al., 2007a).
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from banks with more third party guarantees. This research also showed that more
intervention by regional government is related to a stronger role of state control in
reducing collateral requirements.
Although the state often retains substantial ownership in China’s listed firms, this
ownership is undertaken by different types of agencies, each of which has
different motivations and incentive structures (as will be explained later).
Additionally, following Chen et al. (2009), I grouped SOEs into those affiliated to
central government (SOECGs) and those affiliated to local government (SOELGs),
and found that SOECGs had the lowest level of collateral requirements, SOELGs
are in the middle, and non-SOEs face the highest collateral requirements. I also
argued that state ownership is important for bank finance in the Chinese private
sector; indeed this chapter found that having a state minority ownership
significantly reduced the collateral requirements of non-SOEs.

This chapter contributes to the literature in three significant ways. Firstly, it
provides a useful test of whether the theories that were established and applied to
explain the determinants of collateral in developed markets are applicable to
emerging markets. Menkhoff et al. (2006, 2012) sought to determine whether
there were systematic differences in collateral based lending between mature and
emerging markets. They analysed a data set of credit files from Thai financial
institutions, and discovered that the need for collateral was higher in less
developed markets, and borrowers could overcome the threatening lack of
collateral by substitutes such as third party guarantees and relationship lending.
This thesis complements their studies, and also found that firms with a close
relationship with the government were more likely receive unsecured loans than
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their counterparts without such a relationship, and its role in reducing their
collateral requirements could be substituted by third party guarantees. Firms can
also reduce the use of collateral by issuing foreign shares, which also weakens the
effect that state ownership has in gaining access to unsecured loans.

Secondly, I present fresh evidence on the interaction between state ownership and
institutions of government intervention to affect collateral requirements. Existing
studies have indicated the role of more marketised institutions in encouraging the
use of unsecured financing (Hainz, 2003; Jimenez et al. 2006; Qian and Strahan,
2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009). A priori, however, it is not clear how state
ownership interacts with the level of government intervention to influence
collateral requirements. My finding indicates that the role for state ownership in
the use of collateral is based on government intervention, a practice that can also
hold lessons for other developing countries who are struggling with imperfect
institutional environments and nascent financial markets.

Finally, state ownership in China has been gradually declining, just like other
countries in transition, which motivated Chen et al. (2008) to investigate the
performance of China’s listed firms when there was a change of the type of
controlling shareholder. This research provided an empirical basis for predicting
the impact that changes in the type of ownership control will have on restrictions
in loan contracts from the perspective of collateral requirements, which is in
instrumental in explaining how the type of controlling shareholder affects
corporate performance. Understanding this relationship can help the government
to formulate further reform policies for the corporate sector.
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This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the research
background and hypotheses. Section 3.3 outlines the data and methodology.
Section 3.4 presents the results of the main tests. Section 3.5 provides additional
tests and Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2

Development of hypothesis

Previous theories suggest that if lenders are aware of a borrower’s reliability, they
will demand that high risk borrowers provide collateral that protects their loans in
case of a default. For example, Gonas et al. (2004) found that firms with better
public ratings are less likely to be required to pledge collateral. In the Chinese
financial system, bank loans are the main external finance for firms which are
under the control of the government. These state-owned banks are inclined to lend
to SOEs with lower collateral requirements because their banking relationships
have already been established, and non-SOEs face severe discrimination when
seeking bank loans. Moreover, when SOEs run into financial trouble, they often
look to the government for additional funding and they are more likely to be
bailed out by the government because of their political and social objectives
(Faccio et al., 2006; Brown and Dinc, 2011). In this sense, banks may require
lower collateral against SOEs relative to non-SOEs. Empirically, Brant and Li
(2003) showed that private enterprises and privatised township and village
enterprises are more likely to pledge collateral than township and village
enterprises in China’s rural areas. For publicly listed firms, Chen et al. (2013) find
that from 2001 to 2006, SOEs in China were less likely than non-SOEs to pledge
collateral for bank loans. However, it is an empirical question as to whether the
presence of state-owned controlling shareholders still plays a role in gaining
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access to unsecured loans for a more recent sample period, and I propose the
following hypothesis:

H3.1: SOEs have lower collateral requirements than non-SOEs.

In addition to bank loans and equity financing in the domestic markets, funding is
also available from overseas markets. Collateral may impose opportunistic costs
on borrowers by tying up assets that might otherwise be put to more productive
use (Smith, 1993). Borrowers can also suffer fluctuations in the availability of
credit as the values of their securable assets vary (Berger et al., 2011). If the costs
of collateralised loans are high, then alternative sources of financing would
probably substitute for the collateralised loans. Indeed, foreign capital has become
an increasingly important source of finance for firms in emerging markets.
Moreover, in China, most foreign investors are foreign financial institutions from
developed economies and they have more resources to analyse firm performance.
Therefore, companies with access to global capital markets have an improved
visibility and reputation (Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al., 2003), and they enjoy a
lower cost of capital than their counterparts without access to global capital
markets (e.g., Errunza and Miller, 2000; Doidge et al., 2004; Hail and Leuz, 2004).
In China, it has also been found that foreign ownership affects the informativeness
of earnings, which supports the theory that foreign shareholders improve firm’s
accounting information and transparency (Firth et al., 2007a). Shan and Xu
(2012a, 2012b) further found that foreign investors tend to be attracted by Chinese
companies with good profitability and efficiency to safeguard their investment.
Therefore, firms’ foreign ownership may ultimately reduce their collateral
requirements.
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The net benefits of state ownership may depend on the presence of foreign
ownership because the degree of information asymmetry is higher for more
opaque borrowers and the risk proxies and relationship lending variables have
higher explanatory power for them. For example, Menkhoff et al. (2006) find the
current ratio for the direct risk variable has a greater effect on collateral
requirements for smaller firms. Kano et al. (2011) argued that the benefits of close
bank-borrower relationships on loan contract terms and credit availability are
greater for those without audited financial statements than those with audited
financial statements. Firms with foreign ownership are safer and less opaque, so it
is expect the role of state control to diminish. On that basis the following
hypothesis is proposed:

H3.2: The role of state control in reducing collateral requirements is weaker
for firms with more foreign ownership.

Due to the lack of information, theory suggests that the request for collateral is
higher in less developed markets than in developed markets (Hainz, 2003,
Menkhoff et al., 2006; Bae and Goyal, 2009). The importance of collateral results
in a problem for borrowers in emerging markets because collateral requirements
are expected to be very high while their ability to provide collateral is
comparatively low compared to borrowers in developed markets. Collateral is
therefore not necessary and lenders can issue some credit through relationship
lending and third party guarantees. Therefore, Menkhoff et al. (2012) find that
guaranteed loans are relatively less risky and there is less likelihood of having to
pledge further collateral.
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Moreover, the effect of substitutes depends on whether another substitute is
present and they can substitute for each other because substitutes work
independently of each other. For example, both Behr et al. (2011) and Menkhoff
et al. (2012) find the effect of relationship lending, which is proxy for the
incidence that the borrower is a previous customer of the lender, on reducing the
use of collateral is larger when a third party guarantee is not used. Thus, if state
ownership helps entrepreneurs access unsecured loans because of relationship
lending, I expect that the role of state ownership may differ according to the level
of third party guarantees, and therefore propose the following hypothesis:

H3.3: The role of state control in reducing collateral requirements is weaker
for firms with more third party guarantees.
China’s banks remain largely constrained by government intervention at different
levels. In regions with more government intervention, the government is more
likely to put pressure on the banking system to lend to SOEs, while on the
empirical side, Firth et al. (2009) found that a state minority ownership is
instrumental in obtaining bank loans for China’s non-SOEs in areas where the
banking sector is less market oriented, but it plays no role in lending decisions for
firms in regions where the banking sector is more market oriented. Li et al. (2009)
used a sample of non-publicly traded Chinese firms to explore the role of
ownership structure and institutional development in debt financing. They found
that SOEs tended to have more debt than their non-state-owned counterparts in
areas with poorly developed institutions, whereas the role of state ownership is
insignificant in areas with developed institutions. Moreover, in a more market
oriented region, there are more efficient financial intermediaries and more
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available information about the firms’ activities (Jian and Xu, 2012). Therefore, I
hypothesize that the role of state ownership in reducing collateral requirements
depends on the level of government intervention, and it is argued that:

H3.4: The role of state control in reducing collateral requirements is more
pronounced for firms in regions with more government intervention.

3.3

Data and variables

3.3.1 Sample selection

The initial sample consisted of all the firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2009. The bank loan sample was manually
collected from the footnotes of the annual reports of listed firms. As of 1998,
publicly traded Chinese companies were required to furnish detailed accounting
information in the footnotes of the financial statements in annual reports, such as
the type of bank loan (guaranteed, collateralised, or unsecured), and the amount of
loans for each type. Other corporate financial data used in this research was
gathered from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR)
database. The proxies for the extent of government intervention were sourced
from the NERI (National Economic Research Institute) Index of Marketisation of
China’s Provinces5 (Fan et al., 2011). Both the marketisation index and database
have been widely used in previous research (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Firth et al.,
2006, 2007a and 2007b; Li et al., 2009).

5

This thesis provided a detailed description of the index measure in Appendix A.
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In the beginning there were 4,969 firm-year observations available on the
CSMAR database from 2007 to 2009. I eliminated 523 observations with no
outstanding loans, and of the remaining 4,446 observations, 18 in the financial
industry were also deleted. 109 observations were also removed because the type
of bank loan could not be identified in the financial reports, and another 170
observations without enough financial information were also excluded from the
sample. 387 ST and *ST firm-year observations6 were also eliminated. The final
sample consisted of 3,762 firm-year observations. The sample selection process is
summarised in Table 3.1.

Insert table 3.1 about here

3.3.2 The estimation model

In the empirical analysis I used the percentage of total loans that were
collateralised as a proxy for total collateral requirements and control for variables
that were identified by the current literature in empirical corporate finance (e.g.,
Chen et al., 1998; Jimenez et al., 2006, 2009; Menkhoff et al., 2006, 2012; Allen
and Li, 2011). The measures of the fraction of collateralised loans at the firm-year
level are, by definition, censored, and range between zero and one 7. Since the
dependent variable contains a cluster of zeroes and ones, the OLS results would

6

According to the rules introduced by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in
1999, a firm is designated as a special treatment (ST) firm if it incurs losses for two consecutive
years and a particular treatment (PT) firm if it continues to report a loss for another year. If a PT
firm does not become profitable in one year, it is delisted. PT stocks can be traded only on Fridays
and are limited to a maximum 5% price increase over the previous Friday’s close, but have no
downside limit. Since 2002, the CSRC has ceased the PT designation. Instead, it introduced a new
designation labeled *ST, which is similar to ST but without the transition period. In other words, if
a firm incurs losses for three consecutive years, it is de-listed without a PT period.
7

According to observation summary, 852 observations are left-censored at zero, 2,632
observations are uncensored, and 278 observations are right-censored at one.
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give biased and inconsistent coefficients. Therefore, the tobit model as an
extension of a censored regression model is appropriate (Greene, 2002)8.

In order to gain a sense of the magnitude of these effects, this research also
checked the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables.
The marginal effect of a dummy variable was calculated as the discrete change in
the expected value of the dependent variable, as the dummy variable changed
from 0 to 1.

First of all this research examined the effect of state ownership on collateral
requirements for the full sample and then specified the regression model as:

(3.1)

where
in year t,

is the percentage of total loans that are collateralised for firm i
is the constant, and ε is a normally distributed error term. SOE is a

dummy variable coded one for firm years whose ultimate controlling shareholder
are central or local governments, otherwise zero for a firm year whose ultimate
owners are private investors. FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign ownership,
and GUARANTEE is the percentage of guaranteed loans scaled by total loans.

8

The same approach has been used by Hulburt and Scherr (2003) and Allen and Li (2011).
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In terms of the remaining control variables, one characteristic is firm size (SIZE).
Smaller firms should use secured debt more frequently because they have a higher
probability of liquidation and less ability to access capital markets than larger
firms (Leeth and Scott, 1989; Barclay and Smith, 1995b). Smaller firms, with less
information available to lenders, may also use more secured debt to signal their
quality (Chan and Kanatas, 1985). However, both Leeth and Scott (1989) and
Chen et al. (1998) argued that larger firms (who therefore borrow more) would
find it more economical to use security because the fixed monitoring and
administrative costs associated with secured loans fall on a per unit basis as the
total amount of loan financing rises, and therefore the use of collateral is expected
to increase with the size of the loan. This research measures firm size as the
natural logarithm of total assets and the expected sign is ambiguous9.
If lenders do not know what a borrower’s credit quality is, high quality
(undervalued) firms are more likely to pledge collateral than low quality
(overvalued) firms to signal their credit worthiness to lenders. The chance of high
quality (undervalued) firms defaulting and losing control of the collateral is
smaller, so the lower interest rate on a secured loan makes such financing more
attractive. Following Barclay and Smith (1995a and 1995b), this research uses
abnormal earnings (AE) to empirically measure firm quality. High quality
(undervalued) firms are more likely to have positive future abnormal earnings

9

An alternative approach is to employ a measure of firm size to capture the former and a measure
of total dollar borrowings to capture the latter (as in Chen et al., 1998). Unfortunately, this
approach may give rise to substantial multi-collinearity problems as the two measures are highly
correlated in our samples. As shown by Menkhoff et al. (2006, 2012), this research drops the credit
volume variable from the regression and also avoids a simultaneous-equation bias.
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while low quality (overvalued) firms are more likely to have negative future
abnormal earnings.
The use of secured debt may also mitigate Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) asset
substitution problem and Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem. Therefore,
firms with greater opportunities for future growth (more flexibility in its choice of
future investments and thus more serious problems) should use a greater fraction
of collateralised loans. Following Dittmar (2000), this research uses the ratio of
the book value of the firm’s assets to the market value of the firm’s assets as an
inverse indicator for growth options (B/M).

Accounting statements provide measures of profitability, solvency, and liquidity.
Profitability is measured by the return on assets (ROA). The solvency variable is
leverage, debt/assets (LEVERAGE); term structure, long term loans/total loans
(LTDEBT); and tangibility, fixed assets/total assets (TANGIBILITY). The liquidity
variable is cash and cash equivalents/total assets (LIQUIDITY). I also include a set
of dummy variables to control for the year fixed effects.

This chapter also explored the effects of government intervention on the role of
state ownership in reducing collateral requirements. SOEs can also be divided into
SOEs affiliated to the central government (SOECGs) and SOEs affiliated to local
government (SOELGs). SOECGs refer to SOEs controlled by the central
government under the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administrative
Commission (SASAC)10. Administratively, these SOEs belong to and are closely
monitored by the central government, but are located across provinces and
10

With the changing process of central enterprises, there are 161 SOECGs in 2007, 151 SOECGs
in 2008, and 142 SOECGs in 2009.
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industries. On the other hand, SOELGs are SOEs directly controlled by a local
government. These SOELGs constitute the largest group of shareholders in listed
companies in China. SOECGs were excluded from the sample because this
research wanted to take advantage of the variations of government intervention
where the SOELGs operate, following Fan et al. (2012), and the following model
is estimated11:

(3.2)

where SOELG is a dummy variable coded one for firm years whose ultimate
controlling shareholder is a state-owned enterprise affiliated to local government.
Government size was viewed as the degree of government intervention in prior
empirical studies (Kotera et al., 2012), so this research used a government size
index (GI), which is based on the ratio of employment by the government and
various social organisations to population. The government size index is inversely
related to the level of government intervention12. Table 3.2 lists the definitions of
all variables used in the analysis.

Insert table 3.2 about here

11

The regressions suggest that the results are robust to include SOECGs with registered office
address (untabulated).
12

The higher government size index means the smaller the government size in the province, and
the lesser the extent of government intervention in the province.
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3.3.3 Summary statistics

Table 3.3 lists the summary statistics of variables for the full sample. Panel A
presents descriptive statistics on collateral requirements and panel B shows the
distribution of the sample by the types of controlling shareholder. Panel C
presents the summary statistics of the main variables to be used in the regression
analysis, and panel D reports detailed statistics for collateral requirements based
on years. In Panel A, it is found that the mean (median) of collateral requirements
is 33.8% (23.4%). The means (medians) in Panel D indicate that the level of
collateral requirements was stable across the sample period, which ranged from
32.3% (22.4%) to 34.5% (25.0%). Panel B shows that the collateral requirements
varied across firms according to the different categories of dominant shareholder.
The mean (median) for SOEs was 26.9% (15.1%), whereas the mean (median) for
non-SOEs was 45.1% (42.0%). Panel C shows that foreign ownership has a mean
(median) of 3.9% (0), while 14.6% of sample firms have foreign ownership
(untabulated). Apart from collateral for a loan, a third party guarantee was also
widely used in loan contracts to protect lender investments. I found that 38.6% of
the sample firms’ loans were guaranteed by a third party. In terms of government
intervention, the size of the government index has a mean of 5.43513.

For control variables, Panel C shows that the average firm size (SIZE) of the
sample firms, measured by the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets, is 21.691
(median as 21.535). This is approximately equivalent to RMB 7,831 million
(about US $1,280 million), and the average abnormal earning (AE) is 0.004, and

13

Firms in Tibet and Xinjiang province are excluded, because the indices appear to be outliers.
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the average growth (B/M) is 0.536. Panel C also shows average return on assets
(ROA) is 0.034 and the average leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) is 0.242. Finally, the
average ratio of long term loan to total loans (LTDEBT) is 0.310, the average ratio
of fixed assets to total assets (TANGIBILITY) is 0.281, and the average ratio of
cash and cash equivalents to total assets (LIQUIDITY) is 0.165.

Insert table 3.3 about here

3.4

Empirical results

3.4.1 Univariate tests

To provide some preliminary information, Table 3.4 presents univariate
comparisons of the collateral requirements and the proportion of SOEs between
firms with different microeconomic or macroeconomic factors. I firstly find firms
with foreign ownership are less likely to be required to pledge collateral than
firms without foreign ownership (29.3% versus 34.0%), which is consistent with
the fact that foreign ownership reduces the firms’ collateral requirements, and I
did not find a significant difference in the proportion of SOEs with foreign
ownership compared to SOEs without foreign ownership. Second, I compared
firms with high and low proportion of guaranteed loan. It is found that firms with
more third party guarantees than the median value are less likely to pledge
collateral than firms with less third party guarantees (20.6% versus 47.0%),
whereas the proportion of SOEs are similar across different levels of guarantee
requirements. Finally, I find that firms in more marketised regions have similar
levels of collateral requirements compared to firms in regions with more
government intervention, and better developed regions are associated with less
SOEs. The above summary statistics are suggestive of the effects of
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macroeconomic and microeconomic factors on collateral requirements and I
present the regression results in the next section.

Insert table 3.4 about here

3.4.2 Multivariate tests

Before running the regressions this research also checked the correlation matrix
and the variance inflation factor (VIF). It appears that the VIF was less than 2.44
for all the regressions (untabulated) and all the correlation coefficients were less
than absolute 0.392, which implies that multi-collineality is not a critical issue
here.

Insert table 3.5 about here

As Table 3.6 showed, Column 1 indicates that the percentage of collateralised
loans for SOEs, ceteris paribus, were 15.8% lower than non-SOEs, which was
consistent with hypothesis H3.1, and indicated that state ownership still played a
key role in gaining access to unsecured bank finance in China.

Column 2 showed that foreign ownership had a negative relationship with the
collateral requirements of Chinese listed firms. Specifically, an increase in
ownership by foreigners from the median to the 95th percentile reduced the
collateralised proportion by 6.48% for non-SOEs, while the role of foreign
ownership was just slightly negative for SOEs. The significantly positive
coefficient on the interaction variable between SOE and FOREIGN shows that the
increase in ownership by foreigners from the median to the 95th percentile reduced
the role the state controlling shareholder in reducing the proportion of
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collateralised loans by 6.26%. This means that foreign ownership reduced the role
of state ownership in obtaining unsecured loans, which proved hypothesis H3.2.

Column 3 showed a negative association between the guarantee requirements and
the collateral requirements, which suggested that a loan guarantee acted as a
substitute for collateral and allowed a lender to enforce loans without collateral.
For SOEs (non-SOEs), an increase by 1% in the guaranteed proportion was likely
to reduce the degree of collateral requirements by 0.686% (0.398%). The
significantly positive coefficient on the interaction variable between SOE and
GUARANTEE suggested that in firms without a third party guarantee, the
difference in collateral requirements between SOEs and non-SOEs was larger than
in firms with a third party guarantee, which was consistent with H3.3.

These results also indicated that the collateral requirements of Chinese firms were
affected by the same characteristics as firms in developed countries, that is, the
likelihood of collateral requirements decreased with the size of the borrower
(SIZE). Furthermore, better profitability (ROA) and tangibility (TANGIBILITY)
also implied a lower likelihood of having to pledge collateral. The current ratio
(LIQUIDITY) was negatively associated with the collateral requirements, but the
role was insignificant, whereas the levels of leverage (LEVERAGE) and term
structure (LTDEBT) were both positively related to collateral requirements. Like
Barclay and Smith (1995b), Chen et al. (1998) and Dennis et al. (2000), I found
no strong support for the signalling hypothesis because the relevant variable (AE)
showed an unexpected sign. I also did not find a postulated positive relationship
between growth opportunities and the proportion of secured debt, which was
consistent with previous studies (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995b). Given an
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inverse relationship between growth opportunities and indebtedness in the
Chinese context (Bhabra et al., 2008), an inverse relationship between the former
and the secured debt ratio may be interpreted as a general tendency of growing
firms to decrease the size of debt financing, especially collateralised loans.

Insert table 3.6 about here

With regards to the impact of government intervention, the results of the
regression are shown in Table 3.7. In Column 1 this research controlled for the
government’s size index (GI), with the result indicating there was no significant
relationship between this index and collateral requirements. In Column 2 this
research controlled for GI, along with the corresponding variable that represents
its interaction with SOELG. The significantly positive coefficient on the
interaction variable between SOELG and GI (coefficient= 0.020, p<0.05) seems to
suggest that SOEs were less likely to be required to pledge collateral than private
firms when there was more government intervention in the region but the gap
between these two types of firms decreased as government intervention in the
region decreased, indicating that H3.4 is approved. I also run the regressions that
control for economic development to absorb unmeasured variation in credit
demand and risk14, and the results remain unchanged.

Insert table 3.7 about here

14

Such economic development may be “outcomes” of government intervention and correlated to
government intervention (Jian and Xu, 2012). Controlling for such outcomes might therefore
attenuate the total impact of government intervention.
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3.5 Additional tests
3.5.1 Regression results for further dividing SOELGs and SOECGs

Compared to SOELGs, SOECGs are typically large, complicated and strategically
important enterprises across the nation (e.g., infrastructure, power, transportation,
petrochemicals, steel, telecom, and oil & gas), so it is unlikely that the
government will allow companies such as these to go bankrupt. In addition, local
governments may have less resource than the central government to carry out
bailouts (Cheung et al., 2010). As Table 3.3 indicates, the mean (median) of
collateral requirements for SOELGs was 28.7% (17.2%) while the mean (median)
for SOECGs was 21.3% (9.5%), and about one quarter of SOEs are SOECGs. I
thus expected that listed firms controlled by SOECGs would have lower collateral
requirements than those controlled by SOELGs, and the regression model is
specified as:

(3.3)

where SOELG coded one for firm years whose controlling shareholder is a stateowned enterprise affiliated to local government, and the dummy variable SOECG,
coded one for firm years whose controlling shareholder is a state-owned
enterprise affiliated to central government. Table 3.8 indicates that SOECGs have
a percentage of collateralised loans that is 19.0% lower than non-SOEs and 4.9%
lower than SOELGs. The unreported F-statistics also indicate that these
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differences are economically significant. These results can be further summarised
as follows: SOECGs have the lowest level of collateral among all the types of the
controlling shareholder while non-SOEs collateralise most, and SOELGs are
between non-SOEs and SOECGs.

Insert table 3.8 about here

3.5.2 Regression results for non-SOEs

Although control has been transferred from the state to private investors due to
privatisation, the state often retains a material portion of the company’s shares as
a non-dominant or minority shareholder. Table 3.3 shows that state ownership has
a mean (median) of 1.7% (0) for non-SOEs in the sample, while unreported
statistics indicate that 19.2% of non-SOEs have state minority shareholders.
Evidence also exists to indicate that non-SOEs with a state minority shareholder
have access to more bank loans than other non-SOEs (e.g., Firth et al., 2009). It
might be motivated by having more information about these firms. Furthermore,
private firms with state ownership are more likely to get help from governments
in time of financial difficulties, which may pose less risk for banks, but whether
this determines the collateral requirements in non-SOEs is a question that is under
researched. If this research focused on the role of state ownership in the collateral
requirements for non-SOEs, the model can be expressed as follows:
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(3.4)

where DSTATE is a dummy variable that equals one if the state is a minority
shareholder of non-SOEs. I also considered the proportion of state-owned shares
to total shares (STATE) as an alternative indicator. For the sub-sample of nonSOEs, Column 1 of Table 3.9 shows that the presence of state minority ownership
is likely to reduce the proportion of collateral requirements by 4.6%, while
Column 2 indicates that an increase of 1% in state ownership is likely to reduce
the collateralised proportion for non-SOEs by 0.448%. As with prior studies
which documented that retaining state ownership are important means for nonSOEs gaining access to bank finance, the results suggest that the state ownership
also helps to reduce restrictions in loan contracts.

Insert table 3.9 about here

I also used an alternative approach for the Tobit model and constructed ranks for
the collateral requirements which can be based on 25 percentiles of the collateral
requirements. Hence, the continuous measure of collateral requirements is
transformed into an ordinal variable with four ranks. To analyse a ranked
dependent variable, I applied the ordered logit approach. The regressions suggest
that the results are robust to the model change. In addition, because the loan
guarantee requirements and collateral requirements are jointly determined in the
loan contracts, I addressed this potential endogeneity problem by using the
instrumental variable approach. My instrumental variables are LAYER, which is
defined as the number of layers from the ultimate shareholder to the listed firm.
Prior literature suggests that firms within a complex group with more pyramidal
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layers are more likely to use guaranteed loans because there are more candidates
who can act as guarantors for the loans within a more complex group (Jian and Xu,
2012). I find my results are robust with regards to the instrumental variable
approach.

3.6 Conclusion
This research examined the collateral requirements for a sample of China’s listed
firms from 2007 to 2009, based on a manually gathered database of Chinese
business lending. Besides the firm-specific characteristics which have already
been studied in the literature, this chapter examined the effect of ownership
structure on collateral requirements. The empirical analysis revealed that the
percentage of collateralised loans for SOEs was lower than for non-SOEs. It also
shows that the collateral required for firms with foreign ownership and/or a third
party guarantee was reduced, and the role of state control in reducing collateral
requirements was also weakened in these firms. Finally, this study shows that the
role of state control in reducing collateral requirements was more pronounced for
firms in regions with more government intervention.
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CHAPTER FOUR: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BANKING
RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA’S LISTED FIRMS

4.1

Introduction

Ownership structure is documented to have a potential effect on collateral
requirements and, in particular, SOEs have lower collateral requirements
compared to the collateral requirements of non-SOEs. The benefit of lower
borrowing requirements for SOEs is mainly a result of the SOEs’ banking
relationships with state-owned banks (Firth et al., 2009; Lin, 2011). However,
little is known about how ownership structure influences the firms’ banking
relationships which, in turn, leads to the impact on collateral requirements. Thus,
in this chapter, I investigate the relationship between ownership structure and
banking relationships, and aim to provide a more complete research framework on
the issue of collateral requirements.

The relationship between firms and lenders are key characteristics of credit
markets. Many papers have investigated the motives for multiple banking
relationships (e.g., Ongena and Smith, 2000), but little is known about the
relationship between the borrower ownership structure and the number of banking
relationships. Recent studies also began to contribute to this literature by
comprehensively investigating the matching of firm and bank characteristics.
Information based theories of banking relationships (e.g., Stein, 2002) suggested
that foreign banks are viewed as having a comparative advantage over domestic
banks in underwriting the loans of more transparent firms that rely on quantitative
and transferable information, referred to as hard information, because they can
enjoy scale economies in evaluating such information, while they have a
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comparative disadvantage in underwriting loans of opaque firms that primarily
rely on qualitative non-transferable information, referred to as soft information,
because of difficulties in transmitting information through banking organizations
with headquarters in another nation. At the same time, domestic state-owned
banks often have direct mandates to serve state-owned firms, despite that the
findings of Berger et al. (2008) provide only mixed support for the hypothesis that
state-owned banks establish relationships with state-owned firms. In this chapter
the major research question addressed is: whether the firms’ ownership structures
determine the banking relationships? The analysis of banking relationships
included a study of the reason for the number of banking relationships and the
reasons why a particular bank is chosen.
China’s data set provides an excellent opportunity to test the question, with
information on firms, banks, and their relationships, as well as data on local
market conditions. First of all, the Chinese banking sector is dominated by the Big
Four state-owned banks 15 which absorbed the bulk of those losses from SOEs.
The unhealthy link between SOEs and the Big Four banks is among the chief
worries concerning the future of China’s economic miracle. To alleviate this
problem, the Chinese government established three state-owned policy banks to
take over the policy-lending activities from the Big Four banks. Alongside the
problematic state-owned banks, a breed of dynamic joint stock commercial banks
that organised themselves as companies limited by shares is rapidly emerging. As
a precondition to joining the WTO, China also pledged to open its domestic

15

As of 2009, the Big Four banks owned more than 50% of total banking deposits and loans
according to Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking.
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business to foreign banks. Overall, China’s banking system enables this research
to provide a more complete test for the determinants of lending bank types.

Research on multiple banking relationships suggests that an exclusive banking
relationship for a firm may improve the availability of credit or terms of contract
through relationship lending based on the private information of a single
relationship bank (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd
and Prescott, 1986; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Elsas,
2005). On the other hand, multiple banking relationships might be driven when
one bank cannot meet all the demand of a firm (e.g., Houston and James, 1996;
Detragiache et al., 2000; Machauer and Weber, 2000; Berger et al., 2001, 2005;
Farinha and Santos, 2002). Firms may also seek multiple banking relationships to
mitigate the hold-up problem of a single relationship bank (e.g., Greenbaum et al.,
1989; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Ongena and Smith,
2000). This incentive may be greater when banking markets are less competitive
and offer fewer potential alternatives. Moreover, multiple banking may arise in
response to the soft-budget-constraint problem—a situation where a relationship
bank may refinance unprofitable projects (in the hope of recovering earlier loans),
creating an incentive for strategic defaults on the part of the borrower
(Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). By complicating the refinancing process,
multiple banking enables banks not to extend further inefficient credit and reduces
the borrowers’ incentives to default (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the ownership of the dominant shareholder, which in
many cases is the state, far exceeds that of the second largest shareholder. This
research was therefore able to assess the implications of the type of controlling
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shareholder for setting the type of bank they match. Furthermore, the Chinese
government has historically mandated the banking relationship with SOEs, so the
bank may have more interaction with them than non-SOEs, being motivated by
having more information about these firms. Meanwhile, listed firms are allowed
to issue some foreign shares coupled with the opening up of the stock market to
foreign investors. It remains an open question whether the presence of foreign
ownership affects banking relationships. Because China also combines greater
heterogeneity in institutional development across provinces with homogeneity in
other country-level variables (Li et al., 2009), these differences in the institutional
environment enabled this research to check whether the firm-bank connection can
be ascribed to the evolution of the country’s market institutions.

The empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that SOEs are more likely
obtain bank loans from state-owned banks than non-SOEs. In particular, SOECGs
are more likely obtain bank loans from policy state-owned banks, and SOELGs
are more likely obtain bank loans from the Big Four state-owned banks. The
empirical results also showed that firms with more foreign ownership were more
likely to obtain bank loans from foreign banks, and firms with higher liquidity
were also more likely to obtain loans from foreign banks. There was no significant
difference between SOEs and non-SOEs in the probability of obtaining loans from
joint stock commercial banks, while firms with more foreign ownership or higher
profitability were more likely to obtain loans from this type of banks. The results
also indicated that multiple relationships may arise when firms have state control
or foreign ownership, while firms that operated in regions with better institutional
development had more concentrated ownership in bank loans rather than multiple
relationships.
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This research also introduced the lending relationship variables to the
determinants of collateral requirements and found that policy banks are less likely
to require firms to pledge collateral than the Big Four banks. Joint stock
commercial banks are less likely to require firms to pledge collateral than foreign
banks, while a concentrated banking relationship is associated with lower
collateral requirements, the benefits of which are greater for those firms that
borrow more from joint stock commercial banks.

This research therefore contributes to the body of knowledge discussed below.
Firstly, extant studies have ranked the efficiency of different types of banks and
found that commercial banks outperform state-owned banks, which indicates that
China’s high growth rates cannot be maintained indefinitely without a significant
reform of the banking system (Berger et al., 2009). My empirical research
investigated the link between bank type and the ownership structure of borrowers.
This research therefore contributes to the assessment and comparison of bank
efficiency with empirical evidence that state-owned banks are burdened with
loans of SOEs. Such a loan policy is an impediment for state-owned banks trying
to improve their competitiveness.

This research also complements the growing empirical literature that studies the
impact of foreign bank competition on domestic corporate finance and real
outcomes in a within-country context (e.g., Berger et al., 2001; Haber and
Musaccio, 2005; Mian, 2006), and indicates that deregulation of market entry for
foreign banks could meet the financing needs of firms with more foreign
ownership that require international financing services and firms with higher
liquidity. Moreover, domestic joint stock commercial banks have begun to apply
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economic criteria to a greater extent in their lending decisions, which encourages
the further development of domestic banks.

This research also provides a useful test of the determinants of the number of
banking relationships. Qian and Strahan (2007) and Hernandez-Canovas and
Koeter-Kant (2010) suggested that the firm-level characteristics and the quality of
laws and institutions affect the costs and benefits of multiple banking
relationships which finally determine the number of banking relationships. This
present chapter complements their studies and finds that the ownership structure is
an important factor in determining the number of banking relationships in Chinese
firms. It also presents fresh evidence pertaining to the role that institutions play in
the number of banking relationships using the sub-national data of China. The
advantage of this approach compared to cross-country studies, is that the result
regarding the effect of institutions is free of contamination due to country
differences in accounting rules, culture, and other country-level variables (Li et al.,
2009).

The structure of the remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 develops
the hypotheses based on the Chinese institutional environment. Section 4.3
outlines the data and methodology. Section 4.4 reports the results of the empirical
analyses. Section 4.5 provides additional tests, and Section 4.6 concludes.

4.2

Development of hypothesis

Borrowers with different types of ownership control have different motivations
and incentives which influence the type of bank they match. Commercial banks
primarily aim to maximise the returns on capital contributed by its shareholders
48

while state-owned banks follow the objectives set by the government to maintain
employment and social stability. In terms of borrowers, politically connected
firms transfer the resources of firms for political objectives, while also benefitting
from preferential access to financial resources from state-owned banks. For
example, Khwaja and Mian (2005) find politically connected firms borrow 45 per
cent more and have 50 per cent higher rates of default. Such preferential treatment
occurs exclusively in government banks. What is unique to China, are the dual
roles the government plays as the controlling shareholder of SOEs and as the
owner of state-owned banks. As a result, the controlling government shareholder
is expected to use SOEs and state-owned banks to achieve those policy goals,
even though they may conflict with banks’ own interests. Several papers have
shed some light on the effects of China’s bank ownership type and show that
state-owned banks were less efficient than non-state-owned banks (Lin and Zhang,
2009).

Further

investigation

indicates

that

Chinese

SOEs

receive

a

disproportionately large share of the credit because state-owned banks dominate
China’s banking sectors (Gordon and Li, 2003; Allen et al., 2005). Thus, the
following hypothesis is proposed:

H4.1a: SOEs have a higher probability of obtaining loans from state-owned
banks than non-SOEs.

The nationality of a bank may be a second important characteristic determining its
attractiveness to a firm. Information based theories of banking relationships (e.g.,
Stein, 2002) suggest that foreign banks are less able to process information about
opaque firms and/or their local market conditions, and may be more likely to enter
into relationships with more transparent firms. Empirical evidence that shows how
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foreign banks establish relationships with large and visible firms is consistent with
the above theories (Mian, 2006; Berger et al., 2008). With regards to financial
transparency, more foreign ownership could attract stricter scrutiny from more
sophisticated investors from developed economies (Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al.,
2003). Moreover, companies that issue foreign shares must adopt international
accounting standards which also supports the view that foreign shareholders
improve firm’s accounting information and transparency (Firth et al., 2007a).
Therefore, I expected that firms with foreign ownership were more likely obtain
loans from foreign banks because they are more transparent, and on that basis
proposed the following hypothesis:

H4.1b: Firms with more foreign ownership have a higher probability of
obtaining loans from foreign banks.

Prior studies also investigated the criterion that leads firms to establish a single
relationship rather than multiple banking relationships. Part of the relevant literature supports the idea of maintaining an exclusive bank–firm relationship built on
the belief that a firm with close ties to financial institutions would have greater
access to gaining relevant information and obtaining funds than a firm without
such ties (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and
Prescott, 1986; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Elsas, 2005).
However, a single relationship may not fulfil all needs of the borrowers (e.g.,
Houston and James, 1996; Detragiache et al., 2000; Machauer and Weber, 2000;
Berger et al., 2001, 2005; Farinha and Santos, 2002), and there are problems that
arise from both soft-budget-constraint problems and hold-up problems when a
relationship is close. Since the Chinese government has historically mandated the
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banking relationship with SOEs, the bank has more interaction with them than
non-SOEs. Because of the long term and repeated lending relationship, banks
have developed good channels for obtaining credit information about SOEs, while
non-SOEs may find themselves disadvantaged in this regard and more opaque
(Firth et al., 2009; Lin, 2011). Therefore, I expected SOEs to be more likely to
have multiple relationships because they don’t require single relationships to
address opacity problems as often as non-SOEs, but they may need multiple
relationships to fulfil their needs for funds or set out soft-budget-constraint
problems and hold-up problems. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H4.2a: SOEs have a larger number of banking relationships than non-SOEs.

As discussed above, firms with foreign shares are more transparent so I expected
them to need single relationships to address opacity problems less often, whereas
banks with a single relationship may not fulfil all their credit requirements or
result in soft-budget-constraint problems and hold-up problems. Above all, given
that such multi-national firms are often in many localities and require both
domestic and international services, local banks may not have offices in all the
localities where the firm needs services, or have sufficient expertise in the local
services. Therefore, I expected that firms with more foreign ownership may keep
a larger number of banking relationships, and on that basis, proposed the
following hypothesis:

H4.2b: Firms with more foreign ownership have a larger number of banking
relationships.

The sample firms operated across various institutional environments because
different regions in China are moving towards a market-based economy at
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different speeds, including both market competition and law enforcement. As
discussed above, firms may seek multiple banking relationships to meet the
demands of financing or to mitigate the hold-up problem of a single relationship
bank. This incentive may be greater when banking markets are less competitive
and offer fewer potential alternatives in the future event that their bank tightens
contract terms dramatically. For example, Besanko and Thakor (1987) found that
banking sector competition lowers the rents of lenders in all the states of the world.
Regarding the soft-budget constraint motivation for multiple banking, Ongena and
Smith (2000) found that firms maintain a higher number of banking relationships
in countries with inefficient judicial systems and poor law enforcement, where the
potential for problems with soft-budget constraints might be greater. Qian and
Strahan (2007) also concluded that across the world, loans have more
concentrated ownership under better legal and institutional environments. Unlike
these cross-country studies, the measure of the quality of the institutional
framework is with respect to different regions within one country, i.e., China,
which can address the country specific idiosyncrasies (Li et al., 2009).
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H4.2c: The level of institutional development is negatively associated with the
number of banking relationships decreases with local market development.

4.3

Data and variables

4.3.1 Sample selection

The initial sample consisted of all the firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges for the years 2007 to 2009. The bank loan sample was manually
collected from the footnotes of the annual reports of listed firms. To be included
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in the sample, the footnote should contain detailed information such as the term of
the loan (long term or short term), the type of bank loan (collateralised,
guaranteed, or credit), and the amount of loans for each type. Moreover, this
chapter focused on long-term bank loans because the CSRC also required all
listed companies to report the identity of the lender for long term loans. Other
corporate financial data used in this research was gathered from the China Stock
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which has been widely
used in previous research. The level of institutional environments is controlled by
using the NERI (National Economic Research Institute) Index of Marketization of
China’s Provinces (Fan et al., 2011). Each loan observation contains the identity
of the lending bank, the type of bank loan, the amount of loans for each type, and
sufficient data to calculate various control variables. Observations in the financial
industry and ST or *ST firm-year observations are deleted. The final sample
includes 1,487 firm-year observations. Details of the sample selection process are
summarised in Table 4.1. Note that this type of sample selection has also been
used in previous research (e.g., Allen and Li, 2011).

Insert table 4.1 about here

4.3.2 Empirical models
4.3.2.1 Determinants of bank ownership type

This research estimated Equation (4.1) to investigate the effects of ownership
structure on the likelihood of a firm’s reliance on a particular type of bank:
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(4.1)

where

is a dummy variable code one if one or more of

the relationship banks of a firm is of a given ownership type (policy banks, the
Big Four banks, joint stock commercial banks, and foreign banks) and 0 otherwise
for firm i in year t. It was used to examine whether the firm uses at least one bank
of a particular ownership type.

is the constant and ε is a normally distributed

error term. Because the dependent variable is a dummy variable, this research
used a probit model to estimate Equation (4.1).

This research explored the bank ownership type for different types of ownership
control. SOECGs refer to SOEs controlled by the central government under the
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administratively Commission (SASAC).
SOELGs refer to SOEs directly controlled by a local government. I also included
the proportion of foreign ownership (FOREIGN). Overall, this model enabled a
test to be made on whether SOEs tend to establish relationships with state-owned
banks and whether firms with foreign ownership tend to establish relationships
with foreign banks.

This research also included measures of firm size, financial performance, market
characteristics, and location. This research measures firm size (SIZE) as the
natural logarithm of total assets. Accounting statements provide measures of
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profitability, indebtedness and liquidity. Profitability is measured by return on
assets (ROA). The indebtedness variable is leverage, debt/assets (LEVERAGE);
the liquidity variable is cash and cash equivalents/total assets (LIQUIDITY).

Local market characteristics included the banking development index (BD)
developed by Fan et al. (2011) to represent the convenient choice of bank type in
the region where the firm’s headquarters are located.

This research also controlled for the region (east, central, west, or northeast)
where the firm was located to capture the overall economic development of each
region16. I also include a set of dummy variables to control for the year fixed
effects.

4.3.2.2 Determinants of number of relationships

In this section the factors influencing the actual number of banking relationships
were examined.

(4.2)

16

According to Fan et al. (2011), the east China includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan. The central China includes Shanxi,
Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. The west China includes Inner Mongolia, Guangxi,
Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.
The northeast China includes Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.
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where

is a positive integer with count data so a

Poisson regression methodology was used to estimate Equation (4.2), where

is

the constant and ε is a normally distributed error term. The firm characteristics in
Equation (4.2) are identical to those in Equation (4.1). This research expected
transparent firms with state ownership or foreign ownership to be more likely to
have multiple relationships because they don’t require single relationships to
address opacity problems very often and they can use multiple banking
relationships to fulfil their needs for funds, or set out soft-budget-constraint
problems and hold-up problems.

The local market characteristics differ from those in Equation (4.1) and this model
included the marketisation index (MARKETISATION) to control the institutional
development. The sample firms operated under various institutional environments
because different regions in China are moving towards a market-based economy
at different speeds. The index this research used characterises the progress of the
transition towards the market economy in areas that include the extent of
government intervention, the degree of market competition, the development of
product and factor markets and the strength of legal environment, for 31 provinces
and special administrative regions. A higher marketisation index is associated
with a better institutional environment. Table 4.2 lists the definitions of all
variables this research used in the analysis.

Insert table 4.2 about here
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4.3.3 Summary statistics

Table 4.3 lists the summary statistics of variables for the full sample. Panel A
presents descriptive statistics on the relationship bank ownership type. Panel B
shows the number of banks the borrower has transactions with. Panel C shows the
ownership structure of sample firms. Panel D presents the summary statistics of
the main variables to be used in the regression analysis.

Panel A shows that most firms, 75.1%, have a relationship with a Big Four bank,
19.4% have a relationship with a policy bank, 55.4% have a relationship with a
joint stock commercial bank, and 10.0% have a relationship with a foreign bank.
Further analysis in Panel D shows that the majority of loans were issued by the
Big Four banks (54.8%), 11.8% of total loans came from policy banks, 29.8% of
total loans came from joint stock commercial banks, and the remaining 3.6% was
borrowed from foreign banks. For the number of banks the firm negotiates with,
the mean was 2.581, as shown in Panel B. 40.2% of firms have exclusive banking
relationships, 37.7% have two or three banking relationships around the mean
value of 2.581, and 22.1% have banking relationships greater than 3. As shown in
Panel C, SOEs comprise 61.2% of the sample, and about one quarter of SOEs are
SOECGs. Foreign ownership has a mean (median) of 3.2% (0). The untabulated
statistics indicates that 13.1% of the sample firms have foreign ownership and the
average (median) foreign ownership is 24.7% (25.8%), conditional on there being
non-zero foreign ownership. The firm size (SIZE) in the sample has a mean of
RMB 5,496 million17 (about US $898 million). Panel D shows firm performance,

17

Accordingly, the average firm size in the sample is 21.679 in the natural logarithm.
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including return on assets (ROA) and the ratio of total debt to total assets
(LEVERAGE) was used to control for profitability and indebtedness. The average
return on assets (ROA) was 0.034 and the average leverage ratio was 0.259. I also
included controls for the firm’s location in regressions, but do not display these in
the tables. In terms of the banking development index (BD), the mean of index
was 12.106 whereas the marketisation index (MARKETISATION) had a mean of
8.644.

Insert table 4.3 about here

4.4

Empirical results

4.4.1 Univariate test

To provide some preliminary information, this chapter compared the mean and
median of banking relationship cross firm ownership structure to test whether
there were any significant differences. The results are interpreted in Table 4.4.
Firstly, both the mean and median probability of obtaining bank loans from the
policy banks in SOECGs is significantly higher than in SOELGs and non-SOEs,
while there is no significant difference in SOELGs and non-SOEs. Secondly,
SOELGs got a significantly larger probability of obtaining loans from the Big
Four banks than SOECGs and non-SOEs, whereas no significant difference was
found between SOECGs and non-SOEs. Third, SOECGs are found to be more
likely to rely on joint stock commercial banks than non-SOEs, and SOECGs are
found to be more likely to rely on foreign banks than SOELGs. One potential
explanation is that SOECGs are typically larger and more complex, so they
require more types of services from different types of banks, whereas the mean
bank number of non-SOEs was much smaller than SOEs, including both SOELGs
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and SOECGs. Finally, firms with more foreign ownerships are more likely to rely
on foreign banks and tended to have a larger number of lending banks.

Insert table 4.4 about here

4.4.2 Multivariate tests

Before running the regressions, this research also checked the correlation matrix
and the variance inflation factor (VIF). It turns out that the VIF is less than 2.23
for all regressions (untabulated) and all the correlation coefficients are less than
absolute 0.38118. This implied that multi-collineality was not a critical issue here.

Insert table 4.5 about here

Tables 4.6 showed the regression results for the determinants of the bank
ownership types. The probit regression coefficients give the change in the z-score
for a one unit change in the predictor. In order to gain a sense of the magnitude of
these effects the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent
variables were also checked. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is
calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable,
as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. Column 1 shows SOECGs have 7.6
percentage points higher likelihood of maintaining a relationship with a policy
bank and Column 2 shows SOELGs have 5.1 percentage points higher likelihood
of maintaining a relationship with a Big Four bank, which is consistent with
hypothesis H4.1a that SOEs have a higher probability of obtaining loans from

18

The correlation matrices show a larger positive correlation (p=0.457) between the two
macroeconomic control variables, BD and MARKETISATION, but they are not simultaneously
controlled.
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state-owned banks. Specifically, local governments in China have strong
incentives to provide loss-making SOELGs with bank loans from the Big Four
banks in order to achieve policy goals. At the same time, strategically important
SOECGs have a higher probability of obtaining loans from policy banks, which
aim to assume responsibility for non-commercially oriented loans of strategically
important SOECGs. The results in Columns 3 show there is no significant
difference between non-SOEs and SOEs in maintaining the relationship with joint
stock commercial banks. In addition, well-performing firms and firms with
foreign ownership have a higher likelihood of maintaining a relationship with
joint stock commercial banks. It indicates joint stock commercial banks have
begun to apply economic criteria in their lending decisions. In Column 4, the
significantly positive coefficient on the variable, FOREIGN, shows that the
increase in ownership by foreigners is associated with a higher probability of
obtaining loans from foreign banks, which supports hypothesis H4.1b.
Specifically, an increase in ownership by foreigners from the median to the 95th
percentile raises the likelihood that firms have established a relationship with a
foreign bank by 7.03 percentage points. Finally, it is found larger firms (measured
by SIZE) and firms with more credit demand and indebtedness (measured by
LEVERAGE) have a higher likelihood of securing a relationship with all types of
banks. I also use the logistic model and the untabulated results are unchanged19.

Insert table 4.6 about here

19

The cumulative distribution function (CDF) is the normal distribution function for the probit
model and the CDF is the logistic distribution for the logit model, The CDFs of the normal and
logistic distributions are similar, so the two models will produce similar results and the choice of
probit versus logit depends largely on individual preferences (Baum, C.F., 2006).
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This research also examined the factors influencing the number of banking
relationships in Table 4.7. Column 1 shows the result from a Poisson model for
the actual number of relationships. The Poisson model report the expected
increase in log count for a one-unit increase in independent variable and this
research also presented the regression results as incident rate ratios in parentheses.
It was found that controlling for a number of firm-level variables both SOELGs
and SOECGs firms were much more likely to maintain a higher number of
relationships relative to non-SOEs, which approves H4.2a. The incident rate for
SOELGs and SOECGs is 1.183 and 1.251 times the incident rate for non-SOEs,
respectively. In Column 1 this research also found that firms with more foreign
ownership were much more likely to maintain a higher number of relationships
relative to those without foreign ownership, which is consistent with H4.2b. In
particular, an increase in ownership by foreigners from the median to the 95th
percentile raises the number of bank-firm relationship by 28.6 percentage points.
As expected in hypothesis H4.2c, Column 1 also shows a negative association
between the marketisation index (MARKETISATION) and the Number of banking
relationships, which suggests that loans have more concentrated ownership in
regions with developed institutions. The change in the incident rate of Number of
banking relationship is a decrease of 3.2 percentage points for every unit increase
in the marketisation index (MARKETISATION).

As a robustness check, the logarithm of the number of banks was used as the
dependent variable. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation in Column 2 is
qualitatively similar. I also used an ordered logit regression to examine the
likelihood that a firm exhibits multiple banking relationships rather than a single
banking relationship. Specifically, I used a dummy for the dependent variable
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which equals zero if the firm exhibits a relationship with a single bank, one if the
firm is associated with 2–3 banks (given that the average number of bank–firm
relationship is 2.581) and two if the number of bank–firm relationships exceeded
3. The oldered logit model report the log odds and this research also presented the
regression results as odds in parentheses. It was found that for SOELGs and
SOECGs the odds of multiple relationships versus the exclusive relationship were
1.514 and 1.593 greater than non-SOEs, given that all of the other variables in the
model are held constant. In addition, an increase in ownership by foreigners from
the median to the 95th percentile raises the odds of multiple relationships versus
the exclusive relationship by 48.5 percentage points. Furthermore, Column 3
indicates that the change in the incident rate of multiple relationships versus the
exclusive relationship was a decrease of 7.9 percentage points for every unit
increase in the marketisation index (MARKETISATION). Following Detragiache
et al. (2000), this research also estimated a two-step Heckman selection model. In
the first stage the likelihood that a firm has more than one banking relationship
was estimated, and in the second stage the logarithm of the number of
relationships was estimated. The same exclusion restriction was then used to
identify the two-step model. It was assumed that firms’ R&D expense ratio helps
explain whether the firm has more than one banking relationship, because highintensity research firms may be subjected to more rent extraction by a single
relationship bank, but beyond that it will have no effect on the actual number of
relationships. Column 4 shows the second stage of the two-stage selection model
and the sign of independent variables in Column 2 and 4 are generally consistent.

Insert table 4.7 about here
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4.5

Banking relationships and collateral requirements

In this section the lending relationship variables were introduced to the
determinants of collateral requirement regressions. Prior studies indicated that
lenders could mitigate the effect of informational asymmetries through use of
collateral. Compared to foreign banks, domestic banks have more flexibility to
evaluate credit using specific information on firms obtained in the course of
lending, which in turn results in lower demands for collateral (Boot and Thakor,
1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Korting,
1998). Specifically, there is an assumption for purely profit-maximising financial
institutions, while state-owned banks may lack the incentive to identify the most
profitable firms because of government influences. Menkhoff et al. (2012)
suggested that policy banks disburse policy loans or subsidised loans and also
confirmed that policy banks require less collateral on these loans than other banks
with a sample of Thai household loans. Using a hand gathered database of
Chinese business lending, however, Allen and Li (2011) found that politically
connected borrowers received higher collateral requirements in the Big Four
banks relative to other banks, which was consistent with a backlash against
cronyism at the Big Four banks after a clawback program had been introduced.
Prior literature also investigated the impact that the number of banking
relationships had on collateral requirements and consistently found that exclusive
banking relationships relaxed collateral requirements due to prior information in
the single bank (e.g., Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995;
Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Machauer and
Weber, 2000). In particular, if a financial institution operates as the exclusive
bank for a firm, the firm mostly communicates with this particular bank.
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Obviously, this intense communication between both parties creates a mutual trust
and reduces the banks’ risk in granting credit and requirements for collateral.
Moreover, Harhoff and Korting (1998) pointed out that if the number of lenders is
relatively high, any lender will be confronted with a less transparent situation
regarding its access to the firm’s unsecured assets in the case of bankruptcy.
Hence, collateral requirements should increase with the increase in the number of
banking relationships.

According to the hypotheses and variables described in Chapter 3, this research
estimated the following models for regressions:

(4.3)

where

is the percentage of total loans collateralised for firm i in year

t. To account for the possible impact of lender types, the ratio of total loans from
policy banks, joint stock commercial banks and foreign banks was used. POLICY
BANK is the percentage of long term loans from policy banks. JOINT STOCK
BANK is the percentage of long term loans from joint stock commercial banks.
FOREIGN BANK is the percentage of long term loans from foreign banks.
EXCLUSIVITY takes the value of 1 if the firm works with one lender and 0
otherwise. Ownership structure and other control variables are as defined in
chapter 3.
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Column 1 of Table 4.8 shows that the coefficient on POLICY BANK is
significantly negative, which indicates that compared to the Big Four banks,
policy banks are less likely to require collateral, although both are state-owned. In
addition, the coefficient on FOREIGN BANK is insignificant, which suggests
there is no significant difference in collateral requirements between the foreign
banks and Big Four banks. Finally, the significantly negative coefficient on
JOINT STOCK BANK indicates that joint stock commercial banks are less likely
to require collateral and attach more importance to private information in lending.
This research also analysed the influence that the concentration of banking
relationships had on collateral requirements. The coefficient of EXCLUSIVITY
was significant and negative in the regression, and indicated that firms that
maintain concentrated banking relationships have a lower probability of pledging
collateral. The percentage of collateralised loans for firms that work with a single
lender was lower than with multiple lenders by 9.3%.

The next step was to analyse whether the effect of the concentrated banking
relationships differed according to the type of lenders. If the joint stock
commercial banks are more likely to make loans based on private information, the
benefits of exclusive banking relationships would be greater for those firms that
borrow from this type of banks. In Column 3, the cross product term of
exclusivity of relationship (EXCLUSIVITY) and the lender type of joint stock
commercial banks (JOINT STOCK BANK) was introduced and the interaction
term was significantly negative. This indicated that the benefits from exclusive
relationships in reducing collateral requirements were larger in joint stock
commercial banks than other banks. In particular, the percentage of collateralised
loans for firms that borrow from a single joint stock commercial bank was lower
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than from a single other bank by 12.2%. Finally, controlling the macroeconomic
conditions does not affect the result, which is shown in Columns 2 and 4.

Insert table 4.8 about here

4.6

Conclusion

This research examined the ownership structure and banking relationship for a
sample of China’s listed firms from 2007 to 2009, based on a manually gathered
database of Chinese business lending. The empirical analysis revealed that SOEs
tended to have banking relationships with state-owned banks and firms with
foreign ownership were more likely to have a banking relationship with foreign
banks. There was also no significant difference in probability between SOEs and
non-SOEs of obtaining loans from joint stock commercial banks, while firms with
more foreign ownership or higher profitability were more likely to rely on joint
stock commercial banks. This research also found that firms with state or foreign
ownership were more likely to maintain a larger number of relationships, while
firms in region with better institutions were more likely maintain a smaller
number of relationships.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COLLATERAL
REQUIREMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA’S LISTED FIRMS

5.1

Introduction

The agency conflict between large controlling shareholders and other investors
has long been viewed as the key to analysing those corporations with dominant
shareholders. In such firms the largest shareholders will pursue their own interests
by diverting firm resources and transferring assets and profits out of companies or
committing funds to unprofitable projects for private benefits (La Porta et al.,
1999; Claessens et al., 2000). Since these activities increase the probability of
financial distress and bankruptcy, lenders may resort to collateral to protect
themselves against the potential risk of expropriation (Cremers et al., 2007).

The effective governance mechanisms (including both internal and external
governance) can decrease the ability and incentive of the controlling shareholders
to expropriate, and thereby decrease the credit risk faced by lenders. Consistent
with this view, an emerging stream of literature with cross-country evidence
indicates that borrowers with better governance are rewarded with lower collateral
requirements (e.g., Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012). However, Larcker et al.
(2007) argue that existing studies do not have a consensus on the appropriate
measurement of good corporate governance indicators or the number of corporate
governance dimensions. This prompts a natural question: how do various
governance mechanisms affect collateral requirements? In particular, this research
investigated the mechanisms through which the credit risk induced by the
expropriation activities of controlling shareholders at the borrowing firm can be
mitigated or strengthened.
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To answer the question, the relationship between actual corporate governance
practices and collateral requirements is examined using a sample of China’s listed
firms between 2007 and 2009, and rather than relying on the corporate
governance index and country-specific governance (e.g., Francis et al., 2012; Ge
et al., 2012), the monitoring role of other large shareholders to the controlling
shareholder, two-tier boards (including both the board of directors and the
supervisory board) and institutions (e.g., Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012) are tested.
China’s environment is an excellent laboratory in which to conduct the research
for the following reasons. First, China’s listed firms are featured with
concentrated ownership and in many cases the government is the controlling
shareholder. It indicates that the largest shareholder has substantial control over
the firm and potentially exposes creditors to expropriation by dominant owners.
Therefore, this research is able to assess how the governance mechanisms are
used to prevent tunnelling and impact the collateral requirements, and how it
interacts with the type of ownership control. Second, this chapter intends to shed
light on the impact that the supervisory board has on collateral requirements,
which is an important but unexplored corporate governance element that is unique
to China 20 . Last, being a large emerging economy with uneven institutional
development across different regions (Fan et al. 2011), China is also an exciting
laboratory for examining whether the collateral requirements can be ascribed to
the evolution of external governance, compared to country-specific governance
with cross-country studies.

20

The supervisory board in China still lacks rights to appoint and dismiss executive directors,
compared to the German-Japanese corporate governance approach.
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Briefly, the results revealed that the governance mechanisms do influence the
collateral requirements of China’s listed firms, but their effect on collateral
requirements differs according to the types of controlling shareholders. First, I
found that the role of other large shareholders in reducing collateral requirements
and the role of other large shareholders is more significant for non-SOEs. In terms
of a two-tier board structure it was found that firms with a smaller board of
directors, a larger proportion of independent directors, separate chairman and
CEO positions, and a larger supervisory board could decrease their collateral
requirements, and the characteristics of a two-tier board were more significant for
SOEs. Furthermore, it was found that a better regional institution was negatively
related to the collateral requirements of borrowers and the role of regional
institutions was more significant for non-SOEs. Finally, the increase in the
proportion of expert supervisors on the supervisory board in areas of law and
accounting can reduce collateral requirements, and the role is more significant in
better developed regions for SOEs and non-SOEs.

This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, fresh evidence
proving how internal governance by other large shareholders affects firm’s
collateral requirements has now been presented. Extant evidence shows that other
large shareholders can prevent controlling shareholders from tunnelling and
increase firm value (e.g., Liu and Lu, 2007), and this research extends the
literature by providing evidence of the economic consequences that banks
consider about how other large shareholders can reduce tunnelling when
designing loan contracts. The empirical estimation of this relationship was
instrumental in explaining how the internal governance of other large shareholders
affects corporate values.
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Second, Chinese companies are required to establish two-tier boards consisting of
board of directors and supervisory boards. Indeed, the supervisory board is a
typical feature of the German-Japanese governance system. Although Chinese
supervisory boards resemble the German-Japanese governance structure, they still
lack the right to appoint and dismiss executive directors. A new version of
Corporate Law became effective at the beginning of 2006, which largely
addressed the constraints that prevented supervisory boards from functioning
properly. Accordingly, the data used in this study were collected after this critical
point, so there is now a good opportunity to examine whether the collateral
requirements have been affected by the characteristics of the supervisory board.
Moreover, this transition is not natural but an artificial and mutative process that
parallels the development of modern corporation governance in China. This
research also evaluated the effectiveness of these two-tier board structures by
examining whether the characteristics impact on collateral requirements.

Third, prior studies show that country-specific governance mechanisms, such as
the development of laws and institutions, deter expropriation and are instrumental
in obtaining bank credit (Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012). This chapter
recognised large variations in institutional environments across the regions in
China as a unique opportunity for single-country research into the relationship
between external governance and firms’ loan collateral requirements. Compared
to cross-country studies, the use of sub-national data has major advantages in
addressing the issues related to other country-level variables (Li et al., 2009).

Finally, this detailed investigation indicated that supervisor expertise and external
governance complement each other in reducing collateral requirements, which
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suggests that policy makers should work on improving the institutional quality
and monitoring power of supervisory boards together. Besides this interaction
effect, all the sample firms were categorised as SOEs and non-SOEs, so this
chapter provided detailed evidence to the effect that the internal and external
governance mechanisms pertaining to the collateral requirements in Chinese listed
firms, dependent on the type of firm’s ownership control.

The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 reviews
the Chinese institutional environment and develops the hypotheses. Section 5.3
outlines the data and methodology. Section 5.4 reports the results of the empirical
analyses. Section 5.5 provides additional tests, and Section 5.6 concludes.

5.2

Development of hypothesis

An active takeover market does not exist in China, but other large shareholders,
apart from the controlling shareholder, can challenge opportunistic controlling
shareholders. Other large shareholders could constitute a serious obstacle to
expropriation activities by the controlling shareholder in order to protect their own
interests and also generate benefits for other investors, including the banks. For
example, it was found there was a negative relationship between tunnelling in
Chinese listed companies and the presence of other large shareholders (Liu and Lu,
2007). If governance by other large shareholders reduces expropriation by
controlling shareholders and thereby reduces the risk of default, it is also expected
to be negatively related to collateral requirements. In particular, this chapter
outlines the concentration of ownership by other large shareholders such as Liu
and Lu (2007), which is positively related to the governance of other large
shareholders, and thus proposed the following hypothesis:
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H5.1: A concentration of ownership by other large shareholders is negatively
associated with collateral requirements.

In terms of the board of directors, board size is one variable that affects the
effectiveness of the board control function. Compared to small boards, large
boards have a greater risk of being dominated by powerful shareholders, which
enhances the vulnerability of other investors to expropriation. For example,
Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) found board size to be positively related to
minority-investor expropriation in China’s SOEs. If the board loses its ability to
protect creditors from expropriation as its size increases, it is expected that firms
with larger board are more likely to be required to pledge collateral by their
creditors. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H5.2a: Board size is positively associated with collateral requirements.

In addition, agency theorists consider independence to be a crucial aspect of a
board’s monitoring role. In the context of China, which is characterised by
conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholders and other investors,
independent directors should ensure that financial decisions are made to maximise
firm value and should not result in earnings or cash flows that are biased toward
the controlling shareholders (CSRC, 2002). On the empirical side, for example,
Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) found evidence from China’s listed firms that a
larger fraction of independent directors can reduce expropriation by the
controlling shareholder through party related transactions. If more independent
boards can reduce expropriation by controlling shareholders and therefore reduce
the firms’ credit risk, it is expected that firms with more independent board are
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less likely to provide further collateral. The hypothesis to be tested is as stated
below:

H5.2b: The fraction of independent directors is negatively associated with
collateral requirements.

Some researchers argue that the position of CEO should be separate from the
chairman of the board because a dual appointment of CEO and chairman reduces
its independence and its monitoring effectiveness. For example, Liu and Lu (2007)
argued that when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, it is more difficult
for minority shareholders to have a say on important issues and the controlling
shareholders have larger discretionary power in their financial reporting and
tunnelling. Accordingly, this research assumed that the separation of CEO from
the chairman’s position would be better at preventing controlling shareholders
from expropriation, so it can be predicted that in an alternative form, when
borrowers have a dual chairman and CEO, they also have higher collateral
requirements. The hypothesis to be tested is as stated below:

H5.2c: Board duality is positively associated with collateral requirements.

In terms of a supervisory board, prior studies indicated that a larger supervisory
board is more likely to successfully protect the stakeholders’ interests. Banks and
other stakeholders seem to value supervisory boards and appreciate their activities.
For example, Dahya et al. (2003) found that a negative market reaction occurred
when a company failed to include a supervisory report in its annual report, and
more recent research by Shan (2013) discovered that a larger supervisory board
can reduce asset appropriation by the controlling shareholder. If the large
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supervisory board of a borrower can effectively decrease expropriation risks it is
then expected to reduce the risk of default and the corresponding loan collateral
requirements. The hypothesis to be tested is as below:

H5.3a: Supervisory board size is negatively associated with collateral
requirements.

With respect to the final internal governance characteristics, the professional
knowledge and experience of supervisors in areas such as law and accounting
should be able to promote the governance of a supervisory board. Dahya et al.
(2003) pointed out that supervisors are expected to have the necessary
competencies in terms of knowledge and experience to perform their monitoring
role, while Shan (2013) also argued that more supervisors with professional
knowledge or work experience on the supervisory board are related to less
expropriation by the controlling shareholder. If a supervisory board that has more
supervisors with the appropriate professional knowledge or work experience is in
a better position to promote corporate governance, it is predicted to be negatively
related to the level of collateral requirements. The hypothesis to be tested is as
stated below:

H5.3b: The fraction of supervisors with professional knowledge or work
experience on the supervisory board is negatively associated with collateral
requirements.
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5.3

Data and variables

5.3.1 Sample selection

The initial sample consisted of all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges for the years 2007 to 2009. The bank loan sample was manually
collected from the footnotes of the annual reports of listed firms. To be included
in the sample the footnote should contain detailed information of the bank loans
such as loan maturity (long term or short term), the type of bank loan (guaranteed,
collateralised, or unsecured), and the amount of loans for each type. This research
also used the annual reports to identify the independent directors and professional
supervisors. Other corporate financial data used in this research was gathered
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The
level of institutional environments was controlled using the NERI (National
Economic Research Institute) index of Marketisation of China’s Provinces (Fan et
al., 2011). Both of these sources have been widely used in previous research (e.g.,
Chen et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2006, 2007a and 2007b; Li et al., 2009).

Initially there were 4,969 firm-year observations available on CSMAR database
from 2007 to 2009. Table 5.1 describes the sample selection process. First, 523
observations with no outstanding loans were eliminated, and 18 observations in
the financial industry were deleted. 109 observations were then eliminated
because the type of bank loan cannot be identified in the financial reports, and a
further 170 observations with insufficient data to calculate financial data were
also deleted. Moreover, an additional 387 ST or *ST firm-year observations were
also eliminated, as were 579 observations that had insufficient data to calculate
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corporate governance data. The final sample consisted of 3,183 firm-year
observations.

Insert table 5.1 about here

5.3.2 The estimation model

As described in Chapter 3, this section used the percentage of total loans that were
collateralised as the proxy for the level of collateral requirements and the tobit
model with double censoring. In order to make sense of the magnitude of the
effects, this research also checked the marginal effects evaluated at the means of
the independent variables. The marginal effect of a dummy variable was
calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable
as the dummy variable changed from 0 to 1. According to the hypotheses
described in the previous section, this research estimated the following models for
regressions:

(5.1)

where
t,

is the percentage of total loans collateralised for firm i in year

is the constant, and ε is a normally distributed error term.
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First, I used the sum of the percentage points of shareholding by the second to the
tenth largest shareholders as an indicator of ownership concentration by other
large shareholders (Top2_10).

Second, I measured the two-tier board structure by looking at five aspects: the size
and independence of the board of directors, the duality of the CEO and chairman
positions, the size of the supervisory board, and the proportion of professional
supervisors. I used the number of directors on the board to measure the size of the
board of directors (Board size), and the proportion of independent directors on the
board to measure its independence (INDEPENDENCE) 21 . I also included
DUALITY, a dummy variable coded 1 for the duality of CEO and chairman and 0
otherwise. For the supervisory board, I included the number of supervisors to
measure the size of the supervisory board (SB size). Finally, I constructed a
variable that equals the ratio of supervisors on the supervisory board with the
professional knowledge or work experience in areas such as law and accounting to
measure the professional level of the supervisory board (SB expertise).

To account for regional disparities in market development, a regional market
development index (MARKETISATION) was inserted in the 31 provinces of China.
A higher index means that the extent of market development in the province was
greater and it exhibited better external governance.

21

Since 2003 at least one-third of the directors have to be independent and there is little inter firm
variability in the proportion of independent directors in the sample of this research. In light of this,
this research re-classified independent directors as those who also have other directorships because
of their greater board experience (e.g., Ferris et al., 2003).
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The specification of the remaining control variables was based on the current
literature in empirical corporate finance, as described in Chapter 3. Table 5.2 lists
the definitions of all the variables used in the analysis.

Insert table 5.2 about here

5.3.3 Summary statistics

Table 5.3 lists the summary statistics of variables for the full sample. Panel A
presents descriptive statistics on collateral requirements; Panel B shows the
characteristics of ownership structure; Panels C shows the characteristics of the
internal governance; Panel D presents the descriptive statistics of the index that
measures the levels of institutional development; Panel E presents the summary
statistics of other control variables to be used in the regression analysis; and Panel
F reports the collateral requirements based on years. Panel A shows that the mean
(median) of collateralised proportion was 36.0% (27.1%), while the means
(medians) in Panel F indicate that the level of collateral requirements were stable
across the sample period, which ranged from 34.3% (25.3%) to 37.0% (28.6%).
As Panel B shows, SOEs comprise 55.8% of the sample. Panel B also shows that
foreign ownership has a mean (median) of 3.6% (0), and 13.6% of sample firms
have foreign ownership (untabulated). In addition, Panel C shows that the mean
and standard deviation for the concentration of ownership of the second to the
tenth largest shareholders were 19.2% and 13.0%, respectively. Panel C also
shows that the average board size was 9.208 and the median was 9, while the
proportion of outsider directors on the board has a mean of 31.5% and a standard
deviation of 18.4%, and about 15.9% of the CEOs were also the chairman of the
board of directors. Meanwhile, the average (median) of supervisory board size is
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3.965 (3) and the proportion of supervisors with professional knowledge or work
experience on the supervisory board has a mean of 20.0% and a standard
deviation of 21.4%. Panel D shows that the sample firms operated under various
institutional environments where the average (median) score of the marketisation
index was 8.490 (8.75).

Insert table 5.3 about here

5.4

Empirical results

5.4.1 Univariate tests

To provide some preliminary information, Table 5.4 presents univariate
comparisons of the governance characteristics between SOEs and non-SOEs. The
results clearly suggested that non-SOE had more concentrated ownership by other
large shareholders with an average of 0.229 and a median of 0.220, while the
average is 0.163 and the median is 0.134 for SOEs. In terms of a two-tier board
structure, the board size in firms controlled by SOEs was 9.570 in mean, which
was significantly larger than non-SOEs with a mean of 8.752. In addition, SOEs
had a smaller proportion of independent directors with a mean of 0.308 than nonSOE (0.323). Table 5.4 also shows that the SOE are less likely have a duality of
CEO and chairman with an average of 0.105, while the average for non-SOEs was
0.228. In terms of a supervisory board, the non-SOE had a significantly smaller
supervisory board, 3.586 in mean and 3 in median, while SOEs had a typical size
of 4.267 persons on average and 5 in median. In addition, non-SOEs had a smaller
proportion of supervisors with professional knowledge or work experience on the
supervisory board, with an average of 0.173, than SOEs (0.222). With the
geographic locations, it was found the external governance of non-SOEs is better
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than SOEs. Specifically, the marketisation index of SOEs was 8.357 on average
and 8.73 in median, while the marketisation index of non-SOEs was 8.656 on
average and 8.76 in median.

Overall, this section found that the governance characteristics differed across
firms classified by types of controlling shareholders. SOEs had larger boards
(including both the board of directors and supervisory board), a higher proportion
of separation between CEO and chairman, and a higher proportion of supervisors
with professional knowledge or work experience on the supervisory board. NonSOEs had more concentrated ownership by other large shareholders, more
independent boards, and operated in regions with better institutional development.

Insert table 5.4 about here

5.4.2 Multivariate tests

Before running the regressions, the correlation matrix and the variance inflation
factor (VIF) were checked, and it turned out that the VIF was less than 2.57 for all
the regressions and all the correlation coefficients were less than absolute 0.397,
which implied that multi-collineality would not be a critical issue here.

Insert table 5.5 about here

Table 5.6 provides the results from the tobit regressions of the association
between governance of other large shareholders and collateral requirements. First
of all, the results in Column 1 indicated that the loan collateral requirements of
Chinese firms were affected by the same firm characteristics as the determinants
shown in Chapter 3, that is, there is a negative association between the guarantee
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requirements (GUARANTEE) and the collateral requirements; this suggests that a
loan guarantee acts like a collateral substitute and allows a lender to enforce
collateral-free loans. The likelihood of collateral requirements also decreases with
the size of the borrower (SIZE), while better profitability (ROA), tangibility
(TANGIBILITY), and liquidity (LIQUIDITY), also implied a lower likelihood of
pledging collateral. In addition, the leverage levels (LEVERAGE) and term
structure (LTDEBT) were both positively related to collateral requirements. This
research found no strong support for the signalling hypothesis because the
relevant variable (AE) showed a negative sign. This research also did not find a
postulated positive relationship between growth opportunities and the proportion
of secured debt, which may be interpreted as a general tendency of growth firms
to decrease the size of debt financing, especially collateralised loans.

As Column 2 shows, the percentage of collateralised loans for SOEs, ceteris
paribus, was 13.9% lower than for non-SOEs. This indicates that state ownership
still plays a key role in gaining access to unsecured bank finance in China.
Column 3 shows that foreign ownership (FOREIGN) has a negative relationship
with the collateral requirements of Chinese listed firms. It suggests that the
availability of alternative financial resources and improved transparency was
instrumental in gaining access to unsecured bank loans. Column 4 shows there
was a negative relationship between the ownership concentration of other large
shareholders (Top2_10) and collateral requirements, which proves hypothesis
H5.1, and indicates that the second to tenth largest investors can offset
expropriation and help firms obtain collateral free loans.

Insert table 5.6 about here
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Table 5.7 provides the results from the tobit regressions on the association
between a two-tier board structure and collateral requirements. The variables
Board size and SB size were taken in logarithmic form due to their right-skewed
distribution. As expected from hypothesis H5.2a, the coefficient for board size
(Board size) was positive and significant at the 10% level in Column 1, which
suggests that smaller boards are perceived to be better at controlling key business
decisions and ensuring that the interests of all investors are pursued, including
lenders. This research further included the measure for board independence
(INDEPENDENCE), from which it was observed there was a negative and
statistically significant relationship between the proportion of independent
directors and collateral requirements. This result is consistent with the prediction
that banks value the monitoring role of independent directors, and it also proves
hypothesis H5.2b. In terms of the board of directors, this research finally included
the effect of CEO/chairman duality on the collateral requirements using a binary
variable, DUALITY. The empirical result indicates it was positively and
significantly related to collateral requirements, which is consistent with
hypothesis H5.2c, and it also implies that banks consider the separation of CEO
and chairman as a good governance mechanism and reward them with lower
collateral requirements.

Because a supervisory board is important in monitoring the controlling
shareholders and providing credible financial information to banks, Column 2
examined the relationship between the structure of a supervisory board and the
collateral requirements. It was found that the coefficient for the size of a
supervisory board (SB size), and the coefficient for the professional supervisor
proportion (SB expertise) were both significant and negative. These coefficients
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indicate that an increase in the size of a supervisory board and its combined
expertise can reduce the collateral requirements of Chinese listed firms, which is
consistent with hypothesis H5.3a and b. In Column 3, this research combined all
of the variables in a single regression to test the incremental explanatory powers
of different two-tier board characteristics on bank collateral requirements. Again,
it was found that board structure (including size, independence, and duality) and
supervisory structure (including size and professional knowledge) still have an
impact on collateral requirements, while the other results also remain intact. In
addition, I included the index for institutional development (MARKETISATION)
and found a significantly negative relationship between the marketisation index
and collateral requirements. It indicated that banks in well-developed regions are
more likely to lend on a credit basis while banks in poor regions are more likely to
lend based on the amount of collateral.

Insert table 5.7 about here

One important research question is whether the effects of internal and external
governance mechanisms on the collateral requirements in Chinese listed firms
depend on the type of controlling shareholder. To gain further insight, this
research split the sample into two groups based on the type of controlling
shareholder. The results of the split sample regression are reported in Table 5.8.

It was found here that the degree of ownership concentration by other large
shareholders (Top2_10) were insignificantly related to the collateral requirements
in SOEs through Column 1, but were negatively and significantly related to
collateral requirements for non-SOEs through Column 3. In the sample, ceteris
paribus, a one standard deviation increase in ownership concentration by other
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large shareholders reduced the predicted collateralised proportion by 4.14% in
non-SOEs. With an increase of ownership concentration by other large
shareholders, however, the collateral requirements in SOEs did not show any
significant decreases, possibly because of ownership uncertainty and any relevant
uncertainty of government bailout (Tian and Estrin, 2008; Borisova and
Megginson, 2011).

It was also found there was a significantly positive coefficient of the variable
Board size, in Column 1 for SOEs, which showed, ceteris paribus, that one
standard deviation increase in board size increased the predicted percentage of
collateralised loans by about 5.51%. The first regression also indicated that an
increase of board independence (INDEPENDENCE) can significantly reduce the
collateral requirements of SOEs, that is, an increase in board independence from
the 5th to the 95th percentile reduced the predicted collateralised proportion by
5.56% for SOEs. It was then found that the percentage of collateralised loans for
SOEs with a duality of chairman and CEO (DUALITY), ceteris paribus, was
6.00% higher than SOEs with a separation of chairman and CEO. Column 3
shows that the coefficient signs for non-SOEs’ board characteristics are the same
as SOEs but are insignificant at the traditional level. For the supervisory board,
the variable SB size, was instrumental in obtaining unsecured bank loans for SOEs,
but it played no significant role in lending decisions for non-SOEs. Ceteris
paribus, an increase in the size of a supervisory board from the 5th to the 95th
percentile can significantly reduced the predicted collateralised proportion by
5.25% for SOEs. It was also found that the significant negative relationship
between a firm’s collateral requirements and the variable, SB expertise, only
existed in non-SOEs (this research explains it later).
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Finally, it was found there was an insignificantly negative relationship between
institutional development (MARKETISATION) and collateral requirements in
SOEs. This result is consistent with the work of Jian and Xu (2012), which
showed that the benefits of institutional development in loan contracts
requirements decreased for SOEs because the benefits of government intervention
in putting pressure on the banking system to lend to SOEs simultaneously
decreased in regions with better institutional development. Moreover, courts in
China have a long tradition of protecting state interests because the Chinese
judicial system is still treated as part of the government’s administrative system,
but such benefits for SOEs also decrease in regions with better institutional
development (Jiang et al., 2010). For non-SOEs, the significant negative
coefficient on the variable MARKETISATION showed that firms in regions with
more developed institutions were less likely to be required to pledge collateral.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the index from the 5th to the 95th percentile can
significantly reduced the predicted collateralised proportion by 4.20% for nonSOEs. In addition, the costs of a monitoring role by professional supervisors are
quite high, so in practice it may be that firms only benefit from employing experts
in more developed regions where the monitoring cost is lower due to competition
in market intermediaries. Besides, in less developed regions a large number of
judges are former government officers without formal education in law, banks
may not reward a more professional supervisory board with less collateral
requirements. Therefore, I added an interaction term between the proportion of
professional supervisors (SB expertise) and the institutional development index
(MARKETISATION). It was found that an increase in the proportion of
professional supervisors reduced the collateral requirements when the index was
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larger than 8.06 for SOEs and 6.98 for non-SOEs, respectively. The overall results
suggest that SOEs can reduce their collateral requirements by improving their two
tiered board structures, and non-SOEs can further work on ownership
restructuring and supervisory expertise complemented with institutional
development.

Insert table 5.8 about here

5.5

Additional tests

5.5.1 Robustness check of the general results

This research conducted some sensitivity tests to check the robustness of the
results and then compared them with the findings in Table 5.7. The results in
Column 1 of Table 5.9 show that using the natural logarithm of total assets
adjusted board size (Board size) and supervisory board size (SB size) do not
change the quality of the findings and the explanatory power of the model. In the
untabulated analysis, I also used a Herfindahl index (HERF) of the second to the
tenth largest shareholdings to capture the internal governance of other large
shareholders. HERF is defined as the sum of the squares of the proportional
shareholdings of the second to the tenth largest shareholders in the company, and
the results remain unchanged. Because independent directors may be more
effective at monitoring if they have consistency in the work place with the address
of the registered office of the listed firm, I used a dummy variable to indicate
work place consistency and found that it remained negatively related to collateral
requirements22. I also re-classified the variable DUALITY, because of those CEO

22

Company usually invests a few independent directors, and it is subject to the working place of
the independent director with professional accounting title. If there are two independent directors
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who are also vice chairman or director. This alternative definition of duality
yielded similar results to those already reported when using the original definition.

As stated in Chapter 3, this research also used an alternative approach for the tobit
model and constructed ranks for the collateral requirements which can be based
on 25 percentiles of the collateral requirements. Hence, the continuous measure of
collateral requirements was transformed into an ordinal variable with four ranks.
To analyse a ranked dependent variable this research applied the ordered logit
approach. Column 2 shows the result of the ordered logit models and the marginal
effects for the probability of outcome when the collateral requirements are in the
highest quarter in parentheses. The regression result was similar to those in Table
5.7, which suggests that the results are robust to the model change.

Endogeneity of ownership type was less of a problem because it is usually
selected by the state or requires the state’s approval (Firth et al., 2007a).
Identifying instruments for each of the governance quality characteristics is a
virtually impossible task, so this research combined the six statistically significant
firm-level governance quality characteristics into a single governance quality
index (GQI) and then used an instrument for that index in a two-stage least
squares model (2SLS) as Fields et al. (2012). This research created this
governance quality index by assigning a value of one within the index if a
continuous firm governance characteristic was above its cross-sectional median,
and assigned a zero value otherwise, (but this research added a value of one if the
board size was lower than the median value). For the duality dummy (DUALITY),

with accounting professional title, it should be regard as different if the working place of either of
them is different from the registered office address of the company.
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I added a value of one to the other governance quality variable points if there was
a separation of CEO and chairman. Therefore, the index has a maximum of six
and a minimum of zero. Next, I used the firms’ Beta as the instrumental variable.
The variable Beta, which is a proxy for market risk, may motivate the controlling
shareholder to adopt weak governance because controlling shareholders are more
likely to profit from inside information when their firm has higher market risk,
and Beta are only related to firm-level governance but not loan contracting terms
(Francis et al., 2012). Column 3 reports the second stage of the two-stage model
where this research replaced the governance quality characteristics with the
governance quality index. In the first stage (untabulated), the value of Beta was
negative and statistically significant. The second-stage results continued to reveal
that the GQI was significantly and negatively related to collateral requirements.
Based on these results, I concluded that lenders are less likely to require
borrowers to provide collateral in response to their superior governance, which is
consistent with those reported in Table 5.7. For the spit-sample regression, this
research also ran sensitivity tests as in the general result analyses. The results
from the sensitivity tests showed that the conclusions based on the results in Table
5.8 are robust to variable definitions and measurement, model specifications, and
endogeneity issues.

Inset table 5.9 about here

5.5.2 Why is corporate governance important?

In the previous section this research found that corporate governance to be an
important determinant of collateral requirements and then investigated where
corporate governance is important to collateral requirements across SOEs and
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non-SOEs. This study then went a step further and investigated why corporate
governance is important to collateral requirements. Since it has been argued that
corporate governance helps entrepreneurs prevent tunnelling, I can carry out more
direct tests of these predications by estimating the effects of corporate governance
on various measures of tunnelling. The first measure was inter-corporate loans
(also called funds occupation), which is a primary tool that controlling
shareholders use for tunnelling. Following Jiang et al. (2010), other receivables to
total assets (ORECTA) are used to measure inter-corporate loans to controlling
shareholders. However, Jiang et al. (2010) also showed that for those firms in the
top three deciles of “other receivables”, only 30 per cent to 40 per cent of loans
were made to dominant owners and their affiliates.
In China, according to “Content and Format Standards of Information Disclosure
for Securities Issuing Companies no. 7”, listed firms are required to disclose the
amount of transactions between related parties in their financial statements 23 .
Following Cheung et al. (2006), I collected data of business dealings with related
parties 24 and calculated the ratio of sales of goods/services to related parties
relative to primary operating revenues and divided the purchases of
goods/services

from

related

entities

by

primary

operating

expenses,

correspondingly.

23

Detailed disclosures are required within two working days after signing the contract if, for one
party, the total amount of transactions between related parties is larger than 1,000,000 Renminbi
(RMB) or 0.5 per cent of audited net assets, whichever is higher. Moreover, these dealings have to
be approved by the general meeting of shareholders as soon as their size exceeds 10,000,000 RMB
or 5 per cent of audited net assets.
24

To capture potential tunnelling, this research only looks at the deals occurring between the listed
firm and its parent company, other firms controlled by its parent, other firms controlled by
investors exerting a large influence on the listed firm, as well as other firms controlled by
members of the immediate families of any of these parties.
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In the first regression reported in Table 5.10, whether internal and external
governance helped a firm prevent tunnelling was tested by using the other
receivables deflated by total assets as the dependent variable to measure
tunnelling. The first regression showed that both internal and external governance
do indeed prevent tunnelling, with the GQI being negative and significant at the
5% level and marketisation index (MARKETISATION) being negative and
significant at the 1% level. This finding that internal and external governance
helps a firm to prevent tunnelling through inter-corporate loans may partially
explain why such governance affords firms certain advantages in reducing
collateral requirements.

Regression 2 and 3 reported the empirical findings for the log odds of related sales
and related purchases above cross-sectional median with logit model and the odds
ratio is reported in parentheses, respectively. Overall, the main findings are
largely consistent when using these two variables. First, there was a significant
negative influence of internal governance on both related sales and related
purchases (coefficient = -0.078, p<0.05 in Column 2; and coefficient= -0.110,
p<0.01 in Column 3). These results are also in line with the finding in Column 3
of table 5.9 and it indicates that internal governance can significantly reduce the
expropriation of controlling shareholders through business dealings and reduce
collateral requirements accordingly. This research also noted the negative effect
of the marketisation index (MARKETISATION) on related sales and related
purchases (coefficient = -0.041, p<0.05 in Column 2; and coefficient= -0.040,
p<0.05 in Column 3). It was shown that firms operating in regions with better
institutions were less likely to be tunnelled by controlling shareholders through
business dealings than firms operating in regions with poor institutions.
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Insert table 5.10 here

5.6

Conclusion

Using a sample of China’s listed firms during 2007–2009, this research
investigated the effect of internal and external governance on the collateral
requirements of loan contracting, and found that banks were more willing to offer
unsecured loans to non-SOEs with more ownership of the second to tenth largest
shareholders. These results also support the conclusion that two-tier board
structures impact on collateral requirements because banks were less likely to
require SOEs to provide collateral if they had a smaller board of directors, more
independent directors, separation of chairman and CEO, or a larger supervisory
board. There was also a negative association between the level of regional
institutional development and non-SOEs’ collateral requirements, and furthermore,
the benefits of employing professional experts in reducing collateral requirements
began to emerge in more developed regions than less developed regions for both
SOEs and non-SOEs. Overall, these results suggest that both internal and external
governance can mitigate the agency problem and thereby facilitate access to
unsecured finance.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

Collateral is a regular ingredient of risky lending. It serves to limit potential losses
for lenders and serves as an incentive mechanism and commitment signal for
borrowers. China’s banking industry and SOEs have undergone significant
reforms since the late 1970s, and there is also a significant and even growing
problem of regional disparity. Despite having an imperfect legal system and an
under developed financial market, China’s economy has still been growing at high
speed. However, research on developing nations and the financial growth nexus
strongly suggests that these high growth rates cannot continue indefinitely without
significant reform of the banking system and the legal/financial infrastructure
(Berger et al., 2009). Loan financing is the predominant source of external funds
for China’s corporations. This research chose the issue of loan collateral
requirements in Chinese listed companies with the expectation of developing
some preliminary groundwork in the area of corporate finance. The findings from
this thesis are as follows:

6.1

Type of controlling shareholders

In Chapter 3, this thesis examined the effect that the type of controlling
shareholders has on collateral requirements. The empirical results show that SOEs,
which have more government guarantee and less private information with their
lenders, are less likely to pledge collateral. These results are consistent with the
asymmetric information theory that collateral is used by lenders to limit their
potential losses while being used by borrowers to signal their credit worthiness to
lenders. Moreover, such a connection between the type of controlling shareholders
and collateral requirements is weaker for firms with more foreign ownership due
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to less information asymmetry. In addition, the role of state control in reducing
collateral requirements can also be substituted by third party guarantees. Overall,
the results imply that existing theory could satisfactorily explain the effect that the
type of controlling shareholder and its interaction with firm characteristics has on
collateral requirements.

6.2

Lending environment

With regard to the resources of firm loans, this research further investigated their
detailed construction, that is, the type of bank ownership and the number of
banking relationships. I first tested for the types of firms that established
relationships with different types of bank ownership, and identified four specific
types of bank ownership: foreign banks, two types of state-owned banks, and joint
stock commercial banks. These results suggested that SOEs were more likely to
establish relationships with state-owned banks to accomplish a political goal, and
firms with foreign shares may better fit the procedures and approval process of
foreign banks. Furthermore, both SOEs and firms with foreign ownership were
more likely to enter into multiple banking relationships because they are less
opaque. Moreover, the empirical results indicated that lending relationships are
quite an important factor in determining the proportion of collateralised loans of
listed companies. The empirical analysis suggests that an exclusive banking
relationship is instrumental for getting collateral-free loans and the benefits of
such close banking relationships are greater for those firms that borrow from joint
stock commercial banks, who can procure some advantage in producing,
processing, and disseminating private information.
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6.3

Effect of corporate governance

In restructuring SOEs into corporate entities in transition economies, the forms for
the governance structures of these enterprises are significant, but there is difficulty
in generating reliable and valid measures for corporate governance. Therefore,
this research adopted a complex and multi-dimensional construct and collected the
relevant information of corporate governance from annual reports, and then
presented the output for SOEs and for non-SOEs, respectively.

In Chapter 5 the empirical results showed that banks were less likely to require
collateral for firms with high concentration of ownership in the hands of the
second to tenth largest stockholders in non-SOEs. It was also found that loan
contracts have fewer collateral requirements for SOEs when the board of directors
is smaller, more independent, and where the CEO and chairman are separate. In
terms of supervisory boards, a larger supervisory board can reduce the collateral
requirements in SOEs, while non-SOEs are more likely to obtain collateral free
loans if there is more financial expertise on the supervisory board on average.
These results suggest that banks perceive the strength of firm-level governance to
be a factor that reduces the tunnelling of controlling shareholders and reduces the
collateral requirements accordingly.

6.4

Regions’ institutional development

Because China is currently confronted with various levels of institutional
development across different provinces, this thesis used data from the Chinese
provinces to study the relationship between the contracting environment and
financial contracts. Chinese provinces provide a good case for testing this
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relationship because sub-national data can address country specific idiosyncrasies
(Li et al., 2009), and the institutions in these provinces show remarkable
variations (Fan et al., 2011). This thesis controlled for different market
development conditions by using the NERI (National Economic Research
Institute) Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces. These indexes have been
used by previous research, and the areas and indicators that compose the index
were chosen according to the theoretical framework and the characteristics of
current stages of the reform process in China.

On the empirical side, this research observed that the institutional reform process
differs among the regions concerned and that difference plays important roles in
loan contracts, including collateral requirements and the number of banking
relationships. Overall, in Chapter 3, this research found the role of state ownership
in reducing collateral requirements to be stronger in regions with more
government intervention. In Chapter 4, the results suggested that the number of
banking relationships decreased with the development of a local market, while in
Chapter 5 it was found that regional institutional development can reduce the
collateral requirements and enhance the role of supervisory expertise in reducing
collateral requirements.

6.5

Implications

The empirical results and analytical solutions in this research can be possible
references for scholars conducting further research and for policy makers involved
in further economic reform.
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First, this research has significant implications for the development of a
comprehensive theory for the determinants of collateral. This current research
demonstrated that much of the existing theoretical literature on collateral
requirements can be applied to emerging markets, and specifically in China. The
significance of state ownership and its interaction effect with firm-level and
region-level characteristics raises the importance of including ownership
characteristics variables in collateral requirements. This research can also be used
by policy makers as they analyse past experience and develop strategies for future
ownership reform. For example, the findings suggest that introducing foreign
shareholders can reduce information asymmetry, which helps to eliminate the
need for costly collateral in China.

Second, it provides evidence that ownership structure has an important role in
Chinese firms’ financing decisions when choosing the type of bank and number of
banking relationships. Recently, research suggests that the high growth rates in
China cannot be maintained indefinitely without a significant reform of the
banking system (Berger et al., 2009), and the results suggest that in the course of
current banking reforms, state-owned banks still maintain relationships with SOEs,
which can explain their lower profitability than joint stock commercial banks and
foreign banks, and also encourage further reform of bank ownership. This
research also indicates policies that encourage the development of institutions will
help to solve the soft-budget-constraint and hold-up problems, and therefore can
reduce the motivation for multiple banking relationships.

Finally, this research investigated the effect of internal and external governance
on the collateral requirements of loan contracting. Overall, the results suggest that
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both internal and external governance can mitigate the expropriation problems,
and thereby facilitate access to unsecured finance. From the perspective of policy
makers, the results suggest that listed firms could further open up the corporate
sector to other large shareholders for more favourable loan contracts. The
empirical results in this research also echo the measures taken by the authorities to
encourage better corporate governance of listed firms by recommending changes
in the two-tier board structures, which is of great importance to protecting banks.
For example, this research provided support for recent regulatory and listing
requirements (see the newly amended Chinese Corporate Law 2005) concerning
more actively involved and professional boards of supervisors, with the evidence
that more professional supervisors is associated with lower collateral requirements.
In addition, this research might be relevant to reforms to encourage the
development of institutions, and indicates that regional institutions and
professional governance mechanisms complement each other in influencing loan
contracting terms.

6.6

Limitations and prospects for future research

There are some limitations in this study which could also favour further research
interests. The first limitation was sample selection, and while all of China’s listed
firms were used, the situation in the small and unlisted firms was unclear because
data was not available. China’s listed companies comprise a significant part of the
Chinese economy. By 2007, there were 1,625 firms that traded in either one of the
two stock exchanges. The total market value of these firms has grown to RMB
12,137 billion, comprising almost one-third of GDP in 2007. However, the
insights of small and unlisted firms are still important because many of the factors
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that hypothetically influence collateral requirements may differ between small and
large firms. For example, using small firms allows for the presence of various
legal forms (e.g., proprietorships and partnerships), and a firm’s form of legal
organization determines its liability, taxation, and other factors that may affect
collateral requirements. This factor has received little attention in prior research
and this current research could be further improved by surveying and collecting
information from unlisted firms.

Because the data was limited this research also did not have sufficient time
periods to observe the relationship between the institutional change of each region
and changes in firms’ banking relationships and contract requirements, so a
rigorous time series was impossible. Instead, this research conducted a crosssectional analysis making use of the unequal institutional development of different
regions in China. When data becomes available, further research could be done to
examine the effects of change in institutional environments over time.

Finally, further research could be done to examine possible financial and nonfinancial consequences to members with different degrees of collateralised loans
in order to verify the conjectures about the costs and benefits of the use of
collateral more extensively.
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APPENDIX A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKETISATION INDEX

This thesis discussed how the collateral requirements are affected by development of
institutional environments. The NERI (National Economic Research Institute) Index of
Marketisation of China’s Provinces was used in this research to test their effects.

The methodology

The NERI index and all the components are measured in a scale of 0-10. Each province
gets an index value between 0-10 based on the values of all the respective components
of the index. However, it should be noted that the 0-10 scale does not indicate the
“distance” between the current states of a region to the fully developed market economy
because there is no such thing as a “fully developed market economy”. What the index
shows is the relative position in its progress towards a fully developed market economy
compared to other provinces. This means, for instance, that compared to the competition
index value 5.99 that Hunan province gets, Guangdong, which gets 8.33, is more
advanced than Hunan in terms of market competition. The index compares the “relative
distance” between “marchers” on the road, not the “absolute distance” between
marchers to the destination (Fan et al., 2011).

Two steps were taken to construct the actual data into the provincial index. The first
step was to transform all the component variables into 0-10 scale values. Depending
upon whether higher values are indicative of more or less economic freedom, alternative
formulas were used to transform the variables into 0-10 scale values. For some
indicators, higher values were indicative of higher degrees of marketisation reforms.
The formula used to derive the 0-10 rating for these indicators was
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,

where

is the province’s actual value for the component variable,

maximum value for a province in the 1997 base year, and

is the

is the minimum base-

year value for the component. This formula was then used to derive the ratings for all
years. A province’s rating will be close to 10 when its value for the component is near
the base-year maximum, but the rating will be near 0 when the observation for a
province is near the base year minimum. For some indicators, higher actual values are
indicative of less progress in marketisation. Government intervention provides the
example. In such a case, the formula used to derive the 0-10 rating for these indicators
was

. This formula will assign higher ratings to provinces with actual

values that are closer to the base year minimum.
The second step was to determine the “weights” for each component. The final
marketisation index is an arithmetic average of 23 components, noting that using the
principal components analysis to determine the weights on each of the 23 components
leads to no major difference in the relative ranking of regions. Moreover, the 23
components (indicators) of institutional arrangements and policies were classified in 5
major areas and the same procedure was also used to derive the weights for each index
in the construction.

The structure of the Index

This Index is a comprehensive one that captures the following aspects of the regional
market development:

1. Relationship between government and markets:
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a. The role of markets in allocating resources using the ratio of government spending to
GDP.
b. The level of tax burden on rural residents using the ratio of farmer families’ tax bills
to their annual income.

c. The role of government in business using the convenience and simplicity of
administrative examination and approval procedures.

d. The level of enterprise burden in addition to normal taxes using the ratio of non-tax
levies to sales.

e. The size of government using the ratio of employment by the central and local
government, and various social organisations to population.

2. Development of the non-state sector in the economy:

a. The ratio of industrial output by the private sector to total industrial output.

b. The ratio of capital investment by the private sector to total capital investment.

c. The ratio of employment by the private sector to total employment.

3. Development of product markets:

a. The extent to which prices are set by market supply and demand.

i. The extent to which prices of retail merchandises are set by market supply and
demand.
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ii. The extent to which the prices of production factors are set by market supply and
demand.

iii. The extent to which prices of farm products are set by market supply and demand.

b. The extent of regional trade barriers using the ratio of number of trade barriers to
GDP.

4. Development of factor markets:

a. Banking development.

i. Competitiveness of the banking sector using the ratio of deposits taken by non-stateowned financial institutions to total deposits.

ii. The extent to which banks employ economic criteria in their capital allocation using
the ratio of short-term loans to the non-state sector (such as agricultural loans, loans to
village/township enterprises, loans to private enterprises and loans to foreign-owned
enterprises) to total short-term loans.

b. Foreign direct investment (FDI) using the ratio of FDI to GDP.

c. Mobility of labour using the ratio of employment provided by migrant workers to
total employment.

d. Commercialisation of technological innovation using the ratio of volume of
technological transfers to employment by the technology sector.

5. Development of market intermediaries and legal environment:

a. Development of market intermediary service.
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i. Conditions of service of lawyers, accountants, and other market intermediaries.

ii. The degree of industry associations to help the enterprise.
b. Protection of producers’ legal rights using the ratio of number of economic crimes to
GDP.

c. Protection of property rights.

i. The average number of patents applied per engineer.

ii. The average number of patents approved per engineer.

d. Protection of consumer rights using the ratio of number of consumer complaints
received by the Consumer Association to GDP.
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Tables
Table 2.1 Chinese banks: shares of deposits and loans from 2007 to 2009
Banks

Deposits-2007

Deposits-2008

Deposits-2009

Loans-2007

Loans-2008

Loans-2009

(billion yuan)

(billion yuan)

(billion yuan)

(billion yuan)

(billion yuan)

(billion yuan)

Policy banks

42781 (0.08)

56456 (0.09)

69456 (0.09)

39203 (0.08)

52648 (0.09)

65593 (0.09)

Big Four banks

280071 (0.55)

318358 (0.53)

400890 (0.53)

264330 (0.55)

298784 (0.53)

379026 (0.53)

Joint stock commercial banks

172918 (0.34)

213452 (0.35)

276807 (0.36)

163221 (0.34)

200613 (0.36)

260198 (0.36)

Foreign banks

12525 (0.02)

13448 (0.02)

13492 (0.02)

11353 (0.02)

12028 (0.02)

11818 (0.02)

Total

508295

601713

760645

478108

564073

716635
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Table 3.1 Sample selection and distribution
Sample selection

Observations

Firms available in CSMAR database from 2007 to 2009

4,969

Less:
Firms without outstanding loans

523

Loans borrowed by companies in the financial industry

18

Type of loans (collateralised loans, guaranteed loans or credit loans) cannot be identified

109

Observations missing financial data

170

ST or *ST firms

387

Total observations

3,762
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Table 3.2 Definitions of variables
Variables

Definition

COLLATERAL

Percentage of total loans that are collateralised

Non-SOE

Takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
private firm or individual

SOE

Takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
state-owned enterprise

SOELG

Takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
state-owned enterprise affiliated to local government

SOECG

Takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
state-owned enterprise affiliated to central government

FOREIGN

Percentage of foreign ownership

GUARANTEE

Percentage of total loans that are guaranteed

SIZE

Natural logarithm of total assets

AE

Earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t,
divided by the share price in year t

B/M

Total assets in book value/total assets in market value

ROA

Return on assets

LEVERAGE

Total debts/total assets

LTDEBT

Long term loans/total loans

TANGIBILITY

Fixed assets/total assets

LIQUIDITY

Cash and cash equivalents/total assets

DSTATE

Takes a value of 1 if the state is a minority shareholder of the
non-SOE

STATE

Percentage of state ownership

GI

Index based on employment by the central and local government
and various social organisations/population
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics

Variables

N

Mean

5th

95th

Median

Percentile

Percentile

Std. Dev.

0.234

0

1

0.337

Panel A: Collateral requirements
COLLATERAL

3762

0.338

Panel B: Collateral requirements based on the type of ultimate controlling
shareholder
Non-SOE

1416

0.451

0.420

0

1

0.351

SOE

2346

0.269

0.151

0

0.993

0.309

SOELG

1778

0.287

0.172

0

0.999

0.316

SORCG

568

0.213

0.095

0

0.933

0.277

Panel C: Firm or loan characteristics
FOREIGN

3762

0.039

0

0

0.310

0.109

GUARANTEE

3762

0.386

0.339

0

1

0.339

SIZE

3762

21.691

21.535

20.102

23.886

1.192

AE

3762

0.004

0.000

-0.054

0.077

0.068

B/M

3762

0.536

0.488

0.181

1.031

0.264

ROA

3762

0.034

0.035

-0.064

0.125

0.084

LEVERAGE

3762

0.242

0.232

0.020

0.506

0.150

LTDEBT

3762

0.310

0.214

0.000

0.962

0.320

TANGIBILITY

3762

0.281

0.251

0.020

0.625

0.186

LIQUIDITY

3762

0.165

0.136

0.029

0.401

0.123

STATE

1416

0.017

0

0

0.136

0.052

GI

3116

5.435

5.52

2.52

8.02

1.820

Panel D: Collateral requirements based on year
2007

1184

0.323

0.227

0

1

0.327

2008

1260

0.344

0.250

0

1

0.336

2009

1318

0.345

0.224

0

1

0.347

Notes: COLLATERAL is the percentage of total loans that are collateralised. Non-SOE is
a dummy variable coded 1 for firm years whose ultimate controlling shareholder is a
private firm or individual. SOE is a dummy variable coded 1 for firm years whose
ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned enterprise. SOELG is a dummy
variable coded 1 for firm years whose ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned
enterprise affiliated to local government. SOECG is a dummy variable coded 1 for firm
years whose ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned enterprise affiliated to
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central government. FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign ownership. GUARANTEE is
the percentage of guaranteed loans. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. AE is
earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the share
price in year t. B/M is the ratio of the book value of the firm’s assets to the market value
of the firm’s assets. ROA is return on assets. LEVERAGE is debt/assets. LTDEBT is long
term loans/total loans. TANGIBILITY is fixed assets/total assets. LIQUIDITY is cash and
cash equivalents/total assets. STATE is the proportion of state ownership in non-SOEs.
GI is the government size index based on the ratio of employment by the government
and various social organizations to population. The figures for all the value variables are
in China’s currency, RMB.
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Table 3.4 Results of univariate test
Panel A: Mean comparison grouped by borrowers’ share type
Variable

B or H Share

A-Share

Mean

Mean

Std.

Diff.
Std.

COLLATERAL
0.293 0.325
0.340 0.337
SOE
0.585 0.494
0.626 0.484
Panel B: Mean comparison grouped by borrowers’ guaranteed level
Variable

COLLATERAL
SOE

0.047**
0.041

Top tercile

Bottom tercile

Diff.

Mean

Mean

Mean

Std.

Std.

COLLATERAL
0.206 0.201
0.470 0.390
SOE
0.612 0.487
0.635 0.481
Panel C: Mean comparison grouped by government intervention
Variable

Mean

0.263***
0.023

Top tercile

Bottom tercile

Diff.

Mean

Std.

Mean

Std.

Mean

0.354
0.525

0.334
0.500

0.365
0.596

0.348
0.491

0.011
0.071***
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Table 3.5 Multicollinearity diagnostics
Variables

(1)

(1)

1

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(2)

-0.008

1

(3)

-0.010

-0.093***

1

(4)

0.324***

0.170***

-0.070***

1

(5)

0.017

0.002

-0.014

0.001

1

(6)

0.193***

0.069***

0.015

0.392***

0.045***

1

(7)

-0.065***

0.010

-0.045***

0.106***

-0.308***

-0.159***

1

(8)

0.089***

-0.031*

0.090***

0.196***

0.095***

0.246***

-0.267***

1

(9)

0.122***

0.030*

-0.124***

0.373***

0.007

0.167***

0.029*

0.237***

1

(10)

0.177***

0.016

0.010

0.097***

0.025

0.088***

-0.091***

0.294***

0.103***

1

(11)

-0.140***

0.036**

0.025

-0.120***

-0.040**

-0.205***

0.202***

-0.366***

-0.125***

-0.365***

1

(12)

-0.043**

0.083***

-0.029

-0.066***

0.014

-0.011

0.017

0.005

-0.076***

-0.075***

0.064***

Notes: (1) is SOE; (2) is FOREIGN; (3) is GUARANTEE; (4) is SIZE; (5) is AE; (6) is B/M; (7) is ROA; (8) is LEVERAGE; (9) is LTDEBT; (10) is TANGIBILITY; (11) is LIQUIDITY; (12) is GI.
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(12)

1

Table 3.6 Ownerships and the collateral requirements—tobit estimations
Dependent variable: collateral requirements
(1)

(2)

(3)

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

INTERCEPT

2.605***

19.59

2.651***

19.74

2.559***

19.40

SOE

-0.198***

-15.56

-0.206***

-15.62

-0.339***

-13.88

Independent
variable

(-0.158)
FOREIGN

-0.127**

(-0.165)
-2.16

(-0.100)

-0.266***

(-0.272)
-3.08

(-0.209)

-0.125**

-2.07

(-0.099)

SOE*
FOREIGN

0.257**

2.24

(0.202)
GUARANTEE

-0.640***
(-0.504)

-32.92

-0.638***
(-0.503)

-32.80

-0.866***

-28.12

(-0.686)

SOE*
GUARANTEE

0.364***
(0.288)
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9.22

SIZE

-0.093***

-14.18

(-0.074)
AE

-0.299***

0.218***

-3.62

-0.624***

6.13

0.309***

-4.51

0.252***

6.36

-0.372***

10.54

-10.37

-0.107

-0.624***

-4.49

0.219***

0.315***

-0.601***

6.48

0.287***

6.29

-4.69

6.04

(0.227)

0.254***

10.59

0.240***

10.01

(0.190)

-0.370***

-10.30

-0.103

-0.345***

-1.52

-0.101

(-0.081)

(-0.080)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

3762

3762

3762

-1942.55

-1939.79

-1895.18

Log
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-9.68

(-0.273)

(-0.085)

likelihood

-3.42

(-0.476)

(-0.291)
-1.58

-0.271***

(0.174)

(0.200)

(-0.293)
LIQUIDITY

6.06

(0.248)

(0.199)
TANGIBILITY

0.216***

-13.23

(-0.215)

(-0.491)

(0.244)
LTDEBT

-3.63

(0.170)

(-0.491)
LEVERAGE

-0.300***

-0.087***
(-0.069)

(-0.236)

(0.172)
ROA

-14.39

(-0.075)

(-0.236)
B/M

-0.096***

-1.49

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

0.309

0.310

0.326

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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Table 3.7 Joint impacts of ownerships and government intervention on the collateral
requirements, including SOELGs and non-SOEs only—tobit estimations
Dependent variable: collateral requirements
(1)

(2)

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

INTERCEPT

2.753***

16.24

2.802***

16.48

SOELG

-0.175***

-13.15

-0.283***

-7.32

Independent
variable

(-0.143)
FOREIGN

-0.184***

(-0.230)
-2.88

-0.184***

(-0.149)
GUARANTEE

-0.679***

(-0.149)
-32.14

-0.677***

(-0.552)
SIZE

-0.099***

-0.298***

-11.80

-0.098***

0.221***

-3.22

-0.305***

-0.589***

5.59

0.216***

0.299***

-3.95

-0.592***

0.255***

5.56

0.304***

-0.410***

9.75

0.255***

-0.167**

-10.66

-0.408***

0.000

-10.60

(-0.332)
-2.31

-0.159**

(-0.136)
GI

9.75

(0.208)

(-0.334)
LIQUIDITY

5.67

(0.247)

(0.208)
TANGIBILITY

-3.99

(-0.482)

(0.243)
LTDEBT

5.48

(0.176)

(-0.479)
LEVERAGE

-3.34

(-0.249)

(0.180)
ROA

-11.71

(-0.080)

(-0.242)
B/M

-32.04

(-0.551)

(-0.080)
AE

-2.89

-2.19

(-0.129)
0.01

-0.012**

(0.000)

(-0.010)
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-2.38

SOELG*GI

0.020***

2.95

(0.016)
Year

Yes

Yes

Sample size

3116

3116

Log likelihood

-1541.35

-1537.52

0.347

0.348

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a
two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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Table 3.8 Ownerships and the collateral requirements, further dividing SOELGs and
SOECGs—tobit estimation
Dependent variable: collateral requirements
(1)
Coefficient

t-Statistic

INTERCEPT

2.477***

18.13

SOELG

-0.180***

-13.86

Independent
variable

(-0.141)
SOECG

-0.268***

-12.96

(-0.190)
FOREIGN

-0.120**

-2.03

(-0.094)
GUARANTEE

-0.645***

-33.31

(-0.509)
SIZE

-0.087***

-12.85

(-0.069)
AE

-0.306***

-3.62

(-0.241)
B/M

0.201***

5.62

(0.159)
ROA

-0.643***

-4.60

(-0.507)
LEVERAGE

0.312***

6.43

(0.246)
LTDEBT

0.248***

10.40

(0.195)
TANGIBILITY

-0.370***

-10.32

(-0.292)
LIQUIDITY

-0.100

-1.48
131

(-0.079)
Year

Yes

Sample size

3762

Log likelihood

-1930.21

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

0.314

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a
two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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Table 3.9 Ownerships and the collateral requirements, including non-SOEs only—
tobit estimations
Dependent variable: collateral requirements
(1)

(2)

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

INTERCEPT

2.182***

8.92

2.188***

8.91

DSTATE

-0.051**

-2.15

-0.502***

-2.93

Independent
variable

(-0.046)
STATE

(-0.448)
FOREIGN

-0.295***

-3.31

(-0.263)
GUARANTEE

-0.858***

-0.069***

-29.22

-0.320**

-5.55

0.225***

-2.43

-0.591***

4.06

0.278***

0.243***

-2.86

-0.304***

3.68

-0.196**

-0.599***

0.277***

4.13

-2.88

3.66

(0.248)
6.60

0.243***

6.59

(0.217)
-5.39

(-0.271)
LIQUIDITY

-2.42

(-0.535)

(0.217)
TANGIBILITY

-5.57

(0.206)

(0.248)
LTDEBT

-0.315**

0.231***

(-0.527)
LEVERAGE

-0.069***

(-0.281)

(0.201)
ROA

-29.22

(-0.062)

(-0.286)
B/M

-0.855***
(-0.763)

(-0.061)
AE

-3.20

(-0.257)

(-0.766)
SIZE

-0.287***

-0.302***

-5.36

(-0.270)
-2.30
133

-0.190**

-2.24

(-0.175)

(-0.170)

Year

Yes

Yes

Sample size

1416

1416

Log likelihood

-572.64

-570.62

0.471

0.473

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a
two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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Table 4.1 Sample selection and distribution
Sample selection

Observations

Firms available in CSMAR database from 2007 to 2009

4,969

Less:
Firms without outstanding loans

523

Loans borrowed by companies in the financial industry

18

Type of loans (collateralised loans, guaranteed loans or credit loans) cannot be identified

109

Observations missing financial data

170

ST or *ST firms

387

Observations without long term loan

1,073

Lenders cannot be identified (type or number)

1,203

Total observations

1,486
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Table 4.2 Definitions of variables
Variables

Definition

At least 1 policy

Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one relationship bank is
a policy bank and 0 otherwise

At least 1 Big Four

Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one relationship bank is
a Big Four bank and 0 otherwise

At least 1 joint stock

Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one relationship bank is
a joint stock commercial bank and 0 otherwise

At least 1 foreign

Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one relationship bank is
a foreign bank and 0 otherwise

Number of

Numerical variable equal to the number of banking

Relationships

relationships

COLLATERAL

Percentage of total long term loans that are collateralised

Non-SOE

Takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
private firm or individual

SOELG

Takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
state-owned enterprise affiliated to local government

SOECG

Takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
state-owned enterprise affiliated to central government

BIG FOUR

Total long term loans from the big four banks/total long term
loans

POLICY BANK

Total long term loans from policy banks/total long term loans

JOINT STOCK

Total long term loans from joint stock commercial banks/total

BANK

long term loans

FOREIGN BANK

Total long term loans from foreign banks/total long term loans

EXCLUSIVITY

Takes a value of 1 if the firm works with one lender and 0
otherwise

FOREIGN

Percentage of foreign ownership

GUARANTEE

Percentage of total long term loans that are guaranteed

SIZE

Natural logarithm of total assets

AE

Earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in
year t, divided by the share price in year t
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B/M

Total assets in book value/total assets in market value

ROA

Return on assets

LEVERAGE

Total debts/total assets

TANGIBILITY

Fixed assets/total assets

LIQUIDITY

Cash and cash equivalents/total assets

R&D expenses

Ratio of R&D expenses/total assets

BD

Competitiveness of the banking sector and the extent to which
banks employ economic criteria in their capital allocation

MARKITISATION

A comprehensive index that captures the regional market
development
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics
Variables
Panel A: Bank ownership type
At least 1 policy
At least 1 Big Four
At least 1 joint stock
At least 1 foreign
Panel B: Status of firms by number of banking relationships
EXCLUSIVITY
Equal to 2-3
Greater than 3
Total
Panel C: Ownership structure
SOELG
SOECG
FOREIGN
Panel D: Firm or loan characteristics
COLLATERAL
POLICY BANK
BIG FOUR
JOINT STOCK BANK
FOREIGN BANK
GUARANTEE
SIZE
AE
B/M
ROA

N

Mean

Min

5%

Median 95%

Max

Std. Dev.

1486
1486
1486
1486

0.194
0.751
0.554
0.100

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
1
1
0

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

0.396
0.433
0.497
0.300

1486
1486
1486
1486

0.402
0.377
0.221
2.581

0
0
0
1

0
0
0
1

0
0
0
2

1
1
1
7

1
1
1
17

0.491
0.485
0.415
2.113

1486
1486
1486

0.472
0.140
0.032

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
0.288

1
1
1

0.499
0.347
0.100

1486
1486
1486
1486
1486
1486
1486
1486
1486
1486

0.474
0.118
0.548
0.298
0.036
0.344
21.679
0.004
0.541
0.034

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
19.218
-0.936
0.075
-2.746

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
20.270
-0.062
0.193
-0.065

0.432
0.000
0.620
0.067
0.000
0.088
21.583
0.000
0.490
0.036

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.208
1.000
23.445
0.083
1.018
0.127

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
27.809
0.545
1.697
0.400

0.435
0.282
0.412
0.379
0.158
0.404
0.989
0.066
0.256
0.099
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LEVERAGE
TANGIBILITY
LIQUIDITY
R&D
Panel E: Loan market characteristics
BD
MARKETISATION

1486
1486
1486
1486

0.259
0.280
0.157
0.042

0.000
0.001
0.001
0.000

0.043
0.014
0.031
0.000

0.246
0.262
0.129
0.000

0.503
0.613
0.391
0.099

0.742
0.960
0.798
31.209

0.140
0.186
0.117
0.821

1486
1486

12.106
8.644

4.17
0.38

7.67
5.23

12.92
8.77

14.61
11.54

14.65
11.80

2.137
2.040

Notes: At least 1 policy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one relationship bank is a policy bank and 0 otherwise. At least 1 Big Four is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one relationship bank is a Big Four bank and 0 otherwise. At least 1 joint stock is a dummy variable equal to
1 if at least one relationship bank is a joint stock commercial bank and 0 otherwise. At least 1 foreign bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at
least one relationship bank is a foreign bank and 0 otherwise. Exclusivity is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of banking relationships is
one and 0 otherwise. Equal to 2-3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of banking relationships is between 2 and 3, and 0 otherwise.
Greater than 3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of banking relationships is larger than 3 and 0 otherwise. SOELG is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned enterprise affiliated to local government. SOECG is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned enterprise affiliated to central government.
FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign ownership. COLLATERAL is the percentage of total long term loans that are collateralised. POLICY
BANK is measured as the ratio of total long term loans from policy banks. BIG FOUR is measured as the ratio of total long term loans from the
Big Four banks. JOINT STOCK BANK is measured as the ratio of total long term loans from joint stock commercial banks. FOREIGN BANK is
measured as the ratio of total long term loans from foreign banks. GUARANTEE is the percentage of long term loans that are guaranteed. SIZE is
the natural logarithm of total assets. AE is earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the share price in year t.
B/M is the ratio of the book value of the firm’s assets to the market value of the firm’s assets. ROA is return on assets. LEVERAGE is debt/asset.
TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. LIQUIDITY is cash and cash equivalents/total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expenses
to total asset. BD is based on competitiveness of the banking sector and the extent to which banks employ economic criteria in their capital
allocation. MARKETISATION is a comprehensive index that captures the regional market development.
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Table 4.4 Results of univariate test
Panel A: Mean comparison grouped by ownership structure
Mean comparison

Mean comparison

Mean comparison

Mean comparison
Without

With

foreign

foreign

ownership

ownership

0.189

0.231

1.374

0.749

0.749

0.764

0.453

0.518

-2.056**

0.547

0.600

1.391

0.135

0.106

-1.126

0.087

0.185

4.277***

2.990

2.224

-4.700***

2.521

2.979

2.834***

SOELGs

SOECGs

t/z

SOELGs

Non-SOEs

t/z

SOECGs

Non-SOEs

t/z

At least 1 policy

0.175

0.269

2.998***

0.175

0.191

0.699

0.269

0.191

-2.385**

At least 1 Big Four

0.789

0.697

-2.761***

0.789

0.724

-2.689***

0.697

0.724

At least 1 joint stock

0.569

0.601

0.814

0.569

0.518

-1.823*

0.601

At least 1 foreign

0.084

0.135

2.175**

0.084

0.106

1.315

Number of relationships

2.753

2.990

1.300

2.753

2.224

-4.776***

t/z

Panel B: Median comparison grouped by ownership structure
Median comparison

Median comparison

Median comparison

Median comparison
Without

With

foreign

foreign

ownership

ownership

0

0

1.373

0.750

1

1

0.453

1

-2.052**

1

1

1.391

0

0

-1.126

0

0

4.252***

2

2

-2.790***

2

2

0.953

SOELGs

SOECGs

t/z

SOELGs

Non-SOEs

t/z

SOECGs

Non-SOEs

t/z

At least 1 policy

0

0

2.985***

0

0

0.699

0

0

-2.378**

At least 1 Big Four

1

1

-2.751***

1

1

-2.682***

1

1

At least 1 joint stock

1

1

0.814

1

1

-1.821*

1

At least 1 foreign

0

0

2.171**

0

0

1.314

Number of relationships

2

2

0.195

2

2

-4.612***
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Table 4.5 Multicollinearity diagnostics
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(1)SOELG

1

(2)SOECG

-0.381***

1

(3)FOREIGN

-0.022

0.022

1

(4)SIZE

0.131***

0.019

0.039

1

(5)ROA

-0.098***

0.012

0.037

-0.066**

1

(6)LEVERAGE

0.017

-0.010

-0.071***

-0.000

-0.330***

1

(7)LIQUDITY

-0.053**

0.027

0.037

-0.125***

0.168***

-0.243***

1

(8)BD

-0.023

-0.143***

0.031

-0.056**

0.020

-0.011

0.038

1

(9)MARKETISATION

-0.090***

-0.084***

0.151***

-0.043*

0.072***

-0.067***

0.065**

0.457***
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(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1

Table 4.6 Determinants of bank ownership types—probit estimations
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

At least 1 policy

At least 1 Big Four

At least 1 joint stock

At least 1 foreign

Coefficient

z-Statistic

Coefficient

z-Statistic

Coefficient

z-Statistic

Coefficient

z-Statistic

INTERCEPT

-1.789***

-5.29

-0.634**

-2.01

0.130

0.45

-1.528***

-3.93

SOELG

-0.084

-0.99

0.167**

2.05

0.117

1.59

-0.140

-1.37

Independent
variable

(-0.023)
SOECG

0.261**

(0.051)
2.26

(0.076)
FOREIGN

0.551

0.230***

1.50

0.055

2.94

1.131***
(0.305)

0.055

0.253***

0.68

0.123

0.15

0.672**

2.082***

1.61

3.34

0.200***

1.97

0.208***

2.93

1.631***

(0.633)

(0.644)
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1.519***

3.87

0.394***

4.08

(0.064)
2.90

(0.082)
6.83

0.56

(0.244)

(0.079)
1.54

0.078
(0.013)

(0.265)

(0.037)
3.81

(-0.022)

(0.066)

(0.077)

(0.015)
LEVERAGE

0.170

(0.017)

(0.062)
ROA

-0.82

(-0.029)

(0.148)
SIZE

-0.093

(0.046)

0.104

1.05

(0.017)
6.04

0.820**
(0.132)

2.25

LIQUIDITY

0.408

1.03

(0.110)
BD

0.050*

-0.600

-1.65

-0.401

(-0.182)
1.84

0.012

-1.17

(-0.158)
0.48

-0.055**

1.185**
(0.190)

-2.31

-0.001

(0.013)

(0.004)

(-0.022)

(0.000)

Region

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

1486

1486

1486

1486

Log likelihood

-710.37

-769.15

-982.57

-453.84

0.030

0.078

0.038

0.058

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The z-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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2.55

-0.70

Table 4.7 Determinants of the number of relationships
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Poisson

OLS

Oldered logit

2nd stage Heckman

Number

of

banking Logarithm of the number of Multiple versus exclusive Logarithm of the number of

relationships

banking relationships

relationship
Coefficient

Coefficient

t/z

Coefficient

t/z

INTERCEPT

0.280**

2.34

0.097

0.80

SOELG

0.168***

4.60

0.144***

4.15

banking relationships
t/z

Coefficient

t/z

0.621**

2.28

3.74

0.019**

2.16

2.87

0.095***

3.76

1.97

0.411***

2.63

7.20

0.185***

3.65

4.14

1.555***

3.94

11.06

1.314***

3.24

Independent
variable

(1.183)
SOECG

0.224***

(1.514)
4.53

0.159***

3.23

(1.251)
FOREIGN

0.689***

0.276***

4.56

0.460***

2.90

0.224***

8.24

0.245***

7.59

2.064***

0.753***
(2.123)

6.50

0.169***

5.01

(1.251)
LEVERAGE

0.988**
(2.685)

(1.318)
ROA

0.465***
(1.593)

(1.992)
SIZE

0.414***

0.453***
(1.573)

16.91

2.011***

16.08
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1.203***

(7.874)
LIQUIDITY

-0.250

(3.329)
-1.39

-0.100

-0.61

(0.779)
MARKETISATION

-0.032**

-0.205

-0.39

-0.279

-1.62

-2.11

-0.019**

-2.30

(0.815)
-2.68

-0.026**

-2.09

(0.968)

-0.082**
(0.921)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

1486

1486

1486

1486

Log likelihood

-2718.27

-1423.92

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

0.084

0.209

0.102

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
The t/z-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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Table 4.8 The effect of banking relationships on collateral requirements—tobit estimations
Dependent variable: collateral requirements
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

INTERCEPT

4.039***

8.01

4.109***

8.09

3.998***

7.98

4.069***

8.02

POLICY BANK

-0.218***

-2.82

-0.219***

-2.82

-0.209***

-2.79

-0.210***

-2.80

Independent variable

(-0.125)
JOINT STOCK BANK

-0.334***

(-0.126)
-5.24

(-0.192)
FOREIGN BANK

-0.172

-0.320***

-1.07

-0.298

-7.63

-1.632***
(-0.937)

-1.02

-0.317***

-1.39

-0.337*

-7.47

-1.634***

-0.181

-0.319***

0.089

-0.301

-1.38

(-0.940)

-1.630***
(-0.938)
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-3.00

-0.170

-1.30

(-0.098)
-7.53

-0.315***

-7.42

(-0.181)
-1.55

(-0.173)
-27.10

-0.230***
(-0.133)

(-0.183)

(-0.194)
-27.18

-2.89

(-0.104)

(-0.182)

(-0.171)
GUARANTEE

-0.161

-0.221***

(-0.121)

(-0.127)

(-0.093)

(-0.183)
FOREIGN

-5.30

(-0.196)

(-0.099)
SOE

-0.341***

(-0.120)

-0.338*

-1.71

(-0.195)
-24.69

-1.632***
(-0.941)

-24.65

SIZE

-0.130***

-5.55

(-0.074)
AE

-0.732***

0.513***

-2.81

-0.574**

4.26

0.481***

-1.99

-0.592***

2.84

-0.061

-5.53

-0.164***
(-0.093)

-0.602**

0.491***

-0.569***

-0.29

-0.054

-1.97

-0.168***

-2.27

0.512***

-0.593*

2.89

0.487***

4.28

-0.582***

-1.89

-0.048

3.04

(-0.096)

-0.096*

0.508***

4.24

-0.622*

-1.92

0.497***

3.10

(0.286)
-5.23

-0.559***

-4.96

(-0.322)
-0.25

(-0.028)
-3.25

-2.24

(-0.359)

(-0.335)
-0.26

-0.735**

(0.293)

(0.280)
-5.19

-5.57

(-0.424)

(-0.341)

(-0.031)
-3.18

-0.741**

-0.132***
(-0.076)

(0.295)

(-0.327)

(-0.035)
EXCLUSIVITY

4.19

(0.283)

(-0.340)
LIQUIDITY

0.509***

-5.48

(-0.426)

(-0.347)

(0.276)
TANGIBILITY

-2.74

(0.293)

(-0.329)
LEVERAGE

-0.726***

-0.130***
(-0.075)

(-0.418)

(0.295)
ROA

-5.66

(-0.076)

(-0.420)
B/M

-0.132***

-0.041

-0.22

(-0.024)
-1.71

(-0.055)

-0.102*

-1.81

(-0.058)

EXCLUSIVITY*
JOINT STOCK BANK

-0.217**
(-0.122)

Region

Yes

-2.12

-0.212**
(-0.119)
Yes
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-2.07

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

1486

1486

1486

1486

Log likelihood

-1103.04

-1101.69

-1100.80

-1099.54

0.322

0.323

0.323

0.324

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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Table 5.1 Sample selection and distribution
Sample selection

Observations

Firms available in CSMAR database from 2007 to 2009

4,969

Less:
Firms without outstanding loans

523

Loans borrowed by companies in the financial industry

18

Type of loans (collateralised loans, guaranteed loans or credit loans) cannot be identified

109

Observations missing financial data

170

ST or *ST firms

387

Observations missing governance data

579

Total observations

3,183
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Table 5.2 Definitions of variables
Variables

Definition

COLLATERAL

Percentage of total loans that are collateralised

SOE

Takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
state-owned enterprise

FOREIGN

Percentage of foreign ownership

Top2_10

Sum of the percentage of shares held by the second to tenth
largest shareholder

Board size

Number of directors on the board

INDEPENDENCE

Percentage of independent directors on the board

DUALITY

Dummy variable taking the value one if the chairman and CEO
positions are held by the same person

SB size

Number of supervisors on the supervisory board

SB expertise

Percentage of supervisor who has the professional knowledge
or work experience in areas such as law and accounting on the
supervisory board

MARKETISATION A comprehensive index that captures the regional market
development
GUARANTEE

Percentage of total loans that are guaranteed

SIZE

Natural logarithm of total assets

AE

Earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year
t, divided by the share price in year t

B/M

Total assets in book value/total assets in market value

ROA

Return on assets

LEVERAGE

Total debts/total assets

LTDEBT

Long term loans/total loans

TANGIBILITY

Fixed assets/total assets

LIQUIDITY

Cash and cash equivalents/total assets
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics
Variables

N

Median

5th

95th

Std. Dev.

0.360

0.271

0

1

0.342

Mean

Panel A: Collateral requirements
COLLATERAL

3183

Panel B: Ownership structure
SOE

3183

0.558

1

0

1

0.497

FOREIGN

3183

0.036

0

0

0.297

0.107

Panel C: Internal governance
Top2_10

3183

0.192

0.170

0.025

0.434

0.130

Board size

3183

9.208

9

6

13

1.910

INDEPENDENCE

3183

0.315

0.300

0.000

0.636

0.184

DUALITY

3183

0.159

0

0

1

0.366

SB size

3183

3.965

3

3

6

1.288

SB expertise

3183

0.200

0.200

0.000

0.667

0.214

8.490

8.75

4.94

11.02

2.075

Panel D: External governance
MARKETISATION 3183
Panel E: Other controls
GUARANTEE

3183

0.397

0.358

0.000

1.000

0.338

SIZE

3183

21.565

21.461

20.057

23.523

1.063

AE

3183

0.003

0.000

-0.052

0.075

0.066

B/M

3183

0.530

0.482

0.180

1.029

0.262

ROA

3183

0.034

0.035

-0.064

0.124

0.087

LEVERAGE

3183

0.240

0.232

0.023

0.487

0.144

LTDEBT

3183

0.303

0.202

0.000

0.965

0.317

TANGIBILITY

3183

0.278

0.248

0.019

0.618

0.185

LIQUIDITY

3183

0.167

0.137

0.029

0.400

0.123

Panel F: Collateral requirements based on year
2007

1006

0.343

0.253

0.000

1.000

0.331

2008

1067

0.366

0.286

0.000

1.000

0.339

2009

1110

0.370

0.271

0.000

1.000

0.353
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Notes: COLLATERAL is the percentage of total loans that are collateralised. SOE is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a stateowned enterprise. FOREIGN is the proportion of foreign ownership. Top2_10 is the
sum of the percentage of shares held by the second to tenth largest shareholder. Board
size is the number of directors on the board. INDEPENDENCE is the percentage of
independent directors on the board. DUALITY is a dummy variable taking the value one
if the chairman and CEO positions are held by the same person. SB size is the number of
members on the supervisory board. SB expertise is the percentage of supervisor who has
the professional knowledge or work experience in areas such as law and accounting on
the supervisory board. MARKETISATION is a comprehensive index that captures the
regional market development. GUARANTEE is the percentage of total loans that are
guaranteed. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. AE is earnings per share in year
t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the share price in year t. B/M is the
ratio of the book value of the firm’s assets to the market value of the firm’s assets. ROA
is return on assets. LEVERAGE is debt/asset. LTDEBT is long term loans/total loans.
TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. LIQUIDITY is cash and cash
equivalents/total assets.
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Table 5.4 Results of univariate test
Variables

Non-

Difference

Non-

Difference

SOEs SOEs

(t-test)

SOEs

SOEs

(z-test)

Top2_10

0.163 0.229

14.657***

0.134

0.220

14.554***

Board size

9.570 8.752

-12.305***

9

9

-11.704***

INDEPENDENCE

0.308 0.323

2.190**

0.300

0.300

2.062**

DUALITY

0.105 0.228

9.606***

0

0

9.471***

SB size

4.267 3.586

-15.367***

5

3

-15.322***

SB expertise

0.222 0.173

-6.478***

0.200

0.000

-7.519***

4.059***

8.73

8.76

4.703***

MARKETISATION 8.357 8.656
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Table 5.5 Multicollinearity diagnostics
(1)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

1
-0.031*
0.017
0.312***
0.017
0.203***
-0.071***
0.093***
0.121***
0.187***
-0.148***
-0.251***
0.213***
0.039**
-0.168***
0.263***
0.114***
-0.072***
(12)
1
0.068***
0.060***
0.058***
-0.045**
-0.005
0.000

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

1
-0.076***
0.099***
-0.006
0.037**
0.008
-0.050***
-0.005
0.008
0.048***
0.182***
0.047***
0.056***
0.034*
-0.016
0.042**
0.139***
(13)

1
0.001
-0.010
0.028
-0.034*
0.090***
-0.130***
0.029*
0.027
-0.101***
0.005
0.002
-0.011
0.002
0.009
0.024
(14)

1
-0.020
0.397***
0.126***
0.185***
0.348***
0.064***
-0.122***
-0.129***
0.253***
0.100***
-0.130***
0.205***
0.109***
0.052***
(15)

1
0.044**
-0.303***
0.082***
0.007
0.019
-0.036**
-0.010
0.005
-0.009
-0.033*
0.003
0.011
-0.004
(16)

1
-0.146***
0.227***
0.157***
0.072***
-0.206***
-0.203***
0.089***
0.003
-0.102***
0.097***
0.034*
0.020
(17)

1
-0.255***
0.023
-0.087***
0.199***
0.127***
0.034*
0.094***
0.014
0.002
0.030*
0.058***
(18)

1
0.205***
0.235***
-0.344***
-0.138***
0.088***
-0.006
-0.073***
0.100***
0.020
-0.019

1
0.055***
-0.125***
-0.016
0.099***
0.062***
-0.098***
0.108***
0.062***
-0.082***

1
-0.343***
-0.057***
0.133***
-0.009
-0.048***
0.153***
-0.011
-0.133***

1
0.234***
-0.033*
0.044**
0.059***
-0.096***
-0.005
0.079***

1
0.095***
-0.098***
0.307***
0.014
-0.026

1
-0.038**
0.014
0.101***
0.017

1
-0.095***
-0.071***
0.040**

1
0.049***
-0.058***

1
-0.039**

1

Notes: (1) is SOE; (2) is FOREIGN; (3) is GUARANTEE; (4) is SIZE; (5) is AE; (6) is B/M; (7) is ROA; (8) is LEVERAGE; (9) is LTDEBT;
(10) is TANGIBILITY; (11) is LIQUDITY; (12) is Top2_10; (13) is Board size; (14) is INDEPENDENCE; (15) is DUALITY; (16) is SB size;
(17) is SB experience; and (18) is MARKETISATION.
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Table 5.6 Governance of other large shareholders and the collateral requirements—tobit estimations
Dependent variable: collateral requirements
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

3.178***

19.8

2.776***

17.06

2.718***

16.49

2.769***

16.6

-0.170***

-12.96

-0.173***

-13.18

-0.182***

-13.94

Independent
variable
INTERCEPT
SOE

(-0.139)

(-0.141)

FOREIGN

-0.186***

(-0.149)
-2.93

(-0.152)

-0.148**

-2.28

(-0.121)

Top2_10

-0.188***

-3.49

(-0.154)
GUARANTEE

-0.679***

-32.23

(-0.545)
SIZE

-0.122***

-0.287***

-32.74

(-0.549)
-15.41

(-0.098)
AE

-0.675***

-0.100***

-0.300***

-32.84

(-0.554)
-12.34

(-0.081)
-3.02

-0.680***

-0.097***
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-0.302***

-32.93

(-0.559)
-11.75

(-0.079)
-3.26

-0.685***

-0.097***

-11.81

(-0.079)
-3.26

-0.292***

-3.19

(-0.231)
B/M

0.177***

(-0.244)
4.52

(0.142)
ROA

-0.472***

0.354***

-3.5

0.248***

6.5

-0.493***

9.49

-0.168**

0.311***

0.253***

-12.53

-0.422***

5.9

-0.191***

-0.608***

0.301***

9.91

0.250***

-4.09

-0.415***

5.7

-0.180**

-0.575***

0.300***

9.78

0.254***

-10.88

-0.407***

9.91

-10.67

(-0.332)
-2.53

-0.146**

(-0.156)

(-0.147)

(-0.119)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

3183

3183

3183

3183

Log likelihood

-1653.76

-1574.69

-1569.65

-1563.17

0.314

0.347

0.349

0.352

(McFadden)

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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5.68

(0.207)

(-0.135)

Adjusted R2

-3.92

(0.244)

(-0.338)
-2.67

5.09

(-0.468)

(0.203)
-11.04

0.196***
(0.160)

(0.245)

(-0.343)
-2.28

5.57

(-0.495)

(0.205)

(-0.396)
LIQUIDITY

-4.04

(0.253)

(0.199)
TANGIBILITY

-0.596***

0.214***

(-0.238)

(0.174)

(-0.484)

(0.285)
LTDEBT

5.54

(0.173)

(-0.379)
LEVERAGE

0.213***

(-0.246)

-2.02

Table 5.7 Two-tier board structure and the collateral requirements—tobit estimations
Dependent variable: collateral requirements
(1)

(2)

(3)

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

INTERCEPT

2.699***

15.6

2.787***

16.68

2.764***

15.93

Board size

0.059*

1.85

0.074**

2.26

Independent
variable

(0.048)
INDEPENDENCE

-0.084**

(0.060)
-2.46

-0.081**

(-0.068)
DUALITY

0.043**

(-0.066)
2.52

0.042**

(0.035)
SB size

2.48

(0.035)
-0.043**

-2.05

(-0.035)
SB expertise

-2.37

-0.061**
(-0.049)

MARKETISATION

-0.055**
(-0.045)

-2.04

-0.054*

-1.82

(-0.045)
-0.009***
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-2.54

-2.88

(-0.007)
SOE

-0.181***

-13.55

(-0.148)
FOREIGN

-0.146**

-0.196***

-2.26

-0.684***

-3.62

-0.098***

-32.93

-0.282***

-11.78

0.198***

-3.1

-0.550***

5.17

0.301***

-3.79

0.259***

-0.095***

-0.288***

0.196***

-0.565***

5.71

0.304***

-11.58

0.256***
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-0.200***

-3.69

-0.683***

-33.03

-0.095***

-11.57

(-0.078)
-3.11

-0.271***

-2.93

(-0.221)
5.12

0.204***

5.33

(0.166)
-3.92

-0.518***

-3.69

(-0.423)
5.78

(0.248)
10.09

-1.86

(-0.558)

(-0.461)

(0.246)
LTDEBT

-32.96

(0.160)

(-0.449)
LEVERAGE

-0.685***

-0.122*

(-0.164)

(-0.235)

(0.162)
ROA

-3.4

(-0.078)

(-0.230)
B/M

-0.183***

-12.78

(-0.100)

(-0.559)

(-0.080)
AE

-2.26

(-0.150)

(-0.559)
SIZE

-0.147**

-0.175***
(-0.143)

(-0.120)

(-0.160)
GUARANTEE

-12.89

(-0.142)

(-0.119)
Top2_10

-0.174***

0.313***

5.96

(0.255)
9.99

0.254***

9.84

(0.211)
TANGIBILITY

-0.415***

(0.209)
-10.84

(-0.339)
LIQUIDITY

-0.147**

-0.404***

(0.207)
-10.57

(-0.329)
-2.04

-0.148**

-0.424***
(-0.346)

-2.06

-0.148**

(-0.120)

(-0.121)

(-0.121)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

3183

3183

3183

Log likelihood

-1555.61

-1558.94

-1546.89

0.355

0.354

0.359

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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-11.03

-2.06

Table 5.8 Collateral requirements, group by the type of ultimate controlling shareholder—tobit estimations
Dependent variable: collateral requirements
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

SOEs

SOEs

Non-SOEs

Non-SOEs

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Coefficient

t-Statistic

INTERCEPT

2.735***

11.54

2.631***

10.76

2.326***

8.94

2.219***

8.41

Board size

0.107**

2.34

0.106**

2.32

0.043

0.91

0.045

0.95

Independent
variable

(0.079)
INDEPENDENCE

-0.121***

(0.078)
-2.72

(-0.089)
DUALITY

0.079***

-0.084***

2.79

-0.015
(-0.011)

0.076***

-2.95

-0.085***

2.69

0.350**

-0.55

0.021

-3.02

-0.016

1.02

(0.258)

-0.084**
(-0.075)
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-0.51

0.022

1.05

(0.020)
-0.48

(-0.014)
2.03

-0.026
(-0.023)

(0.019)

(-0.063)
-0.36

-0.028

(0.040)

(-0.025)

(0.058)

(-0.062)
SB expertise

-2.67

(-0.087)

(0.060)
SB size

-0.119***

(0.039)

-0.016

-0.47

(-0.014)
-2.02

0.389**
(0.349)

2.1

MARKETISATION

-0.008

-1.65

(-0.006)

0.002

0.34

(0.002)

-0.008**

-1.99

(-0.007)

0.001

0.18

(0.001)

SB expertise*
MARKETISATION

-0.044**

-2.17

-0.055***

(-0.032)
Top2_10

-0.006

-0.07

(-0.004)
FOREIGN

-0.006

-0.544***

-0.05

-0.107***

-18.97

-0.273**

-9.86

0.190***

-2.44

-0.574***

3.77

0.332***

-19.02

-0.106***

-0.273**

0.193***

-3.23

-0.590***

-9.74

0.333***

-2.41

-0.850***

-0.072***

-2.48

-0.271**

-29.33

0.195***

-5.71

-0.461**

-2.19
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0.268***

-0.849***

-29.36

-0.070***

-5.6

-0.269**

-2.2

(-0.241)
3.51

0.190***

3.41

(0.170)
-2.47

(-0.413)
4.71

-2.4

(-0.063)

(0.175)
-3.29

-0.227**

(-0.762)

(-0.243)
3.84

-4.64

(-0.203)

(-0.064)

(-0.435)
4.71

-0.229**

-0.345***
(-0.309)

(-0.762)

(0.143)

(-0.423)
LEVERAGE

-0.546***

-4.71

(-0.205)

(-0.201)

(0.140)
ROA

-0.04

(-0.078)

(-0.201)
B/M

-0.005

-0.351***
(-0.315)

(-0.403)

(-0.079)
AE

-0.1

(-0.004)

(-0.401)
SIZE

(-0.050)

(-0.006)

(-0.004)
GUARANTEE

-0.008

-2.64

-0.474**

-2.51

(-0.426)
3.56

0.262***

3.5

(0.245)
LTDEBT

0.242***

(0.245)
6.78

(0.178)
TANGIBILITY

-0.447***

-0.024

6.73

(0.177)
-8.65

(-0.330)
LIQUIDITY

0.240***

(0.241)

-0.446***

-0.018

6.58

(0.219)
-8.64

(-0.329)
-0.2

0.244***

(0.236)

-0.308***

-0.133

-5.45

-0.306***

-1.52

-0.132

(-0.014)

(-0.119)

(-0.118)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

1777

1777

1406

1406

Log likelihood

-924.87

-922.38

-559.21

-555.56

0.253

0.255

0.484

0.487

(McFadden)

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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-5.45

(-0.275)

(-0.018)

Adjusted R2

6.56

(0.218)

(-0.276)
-0.15

0.243***

-1.51

Table 5.9 Robustness check of the general results
(1)

(2)

(3)

Tobit

Ordered logit

2SLS

Collateral requirements

High versus low collateral Collateral requirements
requirements

Coefficient

t/z

2.805***

16.26

Coefficient

t/z

Coefficient

t/z

3.012***

12.88

-0.167***

-2.60

Independent
variable
INTERCEPT
GQI

Board size

0.155**

2.05

(0.127)
INDEPENDENCE

-0.079**

0.042**

-2.32

-0.226**

-0.247**

-2.23

(-0.066)
2.48

(0.035)
SB size

2.92

(0.082)

(-0.065)
DUALITY

0.309***

0.117**

2.12

(0.032)
-2.11

-0.166**
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-2.34

(-0.184)
SB expertise

-0.054*

(-0.044)
-1.82

(-0.044)
MARKETISATION

-0.009***

-0.176***

-2.88

-0.123*

-12.83

-0.198***

-1.87

-0.683***

-3.65

-0.094***

-32.96

-0.271***

-11.53

0.203***

-2.94

-0.517***

-0.154***

-12.74

-0.479**

-2.39

-0.143***

-2.68

-0.405**

-26.43

-0.623***

-35.23

-10.47

-0.087***

-12.58

-2.14

-0.190**

-2.17

6.2

0.219***

6.46

-2.89

-0.337***

-4.68

-2.28

-1.897***

-0.285***

-0.737**
(-0.196)

5.32

(0.166)
ROA

-12.27

(-0.076)

(-0.221)
B/M

-0.547***

(-0.505)

(-0.077)
AE

-2.993

(-0.108)

(-0.557)
SIZE

-0.008***

(-0.128)

(-0.162)
GUARANTEE

-2.94

(-0.149)

(-0.100)
Top2_10

-0.029***
(-0.008)

(-0.144)
FOREIGN

-2.02

(-0.022)

(-0.007)
SOE

-0.084**

0.788***
(0.210)

-3.68

-1.326***
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(-0.422)
LEVERAGE

0.312***

(-0.353)
5.95

(0.255)
LTDEBT

0.254***

-0.424***

9.85

-0.147**

0.343***

7.68

0.687***

8.31

0.206***

10.60

-11.42

-0.388***

-11.66

-2.82

-0.170***

-3.28

(0.183)
-11.04

(-0.347)
LIQUIDITY

8.23

(0.377)

(0.207)
TANGIBILITY

1.414***

-1.460***
(-0.389)

-2.04

-0.615***

(-0.120)

(-0.164)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

3183

3183

3183

Log likelihood

-1548.19

-3679.63

-6076.08

0.358

0.169

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Marginal coefficient is in parentheses.
The t/z-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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Table 5.10 Corporate governance and tunnelling
(1)

(2)

(3)

OLS

Logit

Logit

Other receivables

High versus low related sales High
of goods and services

versus

purchases

of

low
goods

services
Coefficient

t/z

Coefficient

t/z

Coefficient

t/z

INTERCEPT

0.102***

4.5

7.889***

8.11

10.798***

10.18

GQI

-0.001**

-1.98

-0.078**

-2.41

-0.110***

-3.27

Independent
variable

(0.925)
MARKETISATION

-0.002***

-3.94

-0.041**

(0.896)
-2.23

(0.960)
SOE

-0.004***

-2.61

-0.610***

-0.015***

-3.17

-0.590

-7.71

-0.002*

-1.91

-0.342***
(0.710)
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-0.616***

-7.7

(0.540)
-1.6

(0.554)
SIZE

-2.15

(0.961)

(0.543)
FOREIGN

-0.040**

-0.440

-1.17

(0.644)
-7.27

-0.468***
(0.626)

-9.14

related
and

B/M

0.001

0.15

-0.169

-0.74

(0.845)
ROA

-0.088*

-1.89

0.529

-0.004

-0.64

0.466

1.19

-0.150

1.62

0.249

(1.593)

(1.283)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sample size

3183

3183

3183

-2053.59

-1980.51

0.054

0.082

(McFadden)
Adjusted R2

0.069

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
The t/z-statistics are computed using the robust standard error (White).
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-0.31

(0.860)

Year

Log likelihood

-1.9

(0.629)

(1.697)
LEVERAGE

-0.463*

0.85

